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ABSTRACT 
 CREDIT ASSESSMENT PROCESSES AND 
BASEL II ACCORD 
 Cihangir, Nuran  
M.Sc., Department of in Financial Economics 
Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ege Yazgan 
December 2007, 92 pages 
This study analyses the credit assessment processes of a specific financial 
institution in Turkey and compares the main drivers of corporate credit approval 
decisions with the parameters of Moody’s rating model for private companies, 
RiskCalc. The new “International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital 
Standards” or Basel II is expected to bring new applications in terms of credit 
assessment processes to the banking sector. The latest Banking Sector 
Development Report by the Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (BRSA) 
suggests that Turkish Banks are still in the initial phases of implementation of Basel 
II, which tries to achieve global financial stability. Its effectiveness is debated 
especially after the result of the recent turbulence in the financial markets related to 
the sub-prime mortgage crisis. Basel II –Standard Approach is expected to be 
applied by the majority of the Turkish banking sector. This approach implies the 
utilisation of external rating institutions’ grades in the credit assessment processes 
of the financial institutions and requires that each borrower and facility should have 
a rating prior to the bank entering into a commitment to lend.  
To reach the underlined objectives of the study, firstly Basel II framework and its 
application in Turkey in terms of credit assessment processes are presented. 
Secondly, in order to model the credit decision data of the financial institution -
whether to accept a loan application or not- logit and probit regression models are 
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introduced. Those models are among the most practiced methods and mentioned in 
the Basel II framework as the best practices of the banks in their internal credit 
assessment and credit scoring processes.  
Even though not all the parameters for comparison with the model of Moody’s could 
be obtained, the results indicate that qualitative information and/or judgement 
played an important role in the credit approval decision of the analysed financial 
institution. This is because the main criteria applied by Moody’s, such as debt or 
leverage ratios, size variables, liquidity ratios were insignificant. Another main 
criteria, profitability, was only significant in the logit regression. The industry 
(excluding textile) in which the company operated, played no significant role in the 
credit decision, which is also not addressed in the model of Moody’s as a 
parameter. The industry binary variable “textile” was significant in both models. 
Therefore, the models provided a meaningful result about the selectivity of financial 
institutions to grant credit to the textile industry companies due to the recent 
difficulties in the sector. Activity ratios, sales growth and audit quality are other 
parameters utilised by Moody’s. Due to inexistence of appropriate data, these 
measures are not included in this study. It is suggested by Moody’s that, the above 
mentioned ratios and criteria are to be used by the financial institutions. Therefore, 
with the Basel II implementation, it is expected that  those parameters will become a 
criteria in their rating and credit decision models. Basel II-IRB (internal ratings 
based) Approach implementation will lead to similar models as those of rating 
companies to be constructed internally by the financial institutions.  
Keywords: Credit Assessment Processes, Basel II, Developing Country, Corporate 
Loans, , Probit, Logit, Binary Choice Models.  
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ÖZ 
KREDİ DEĞERLENDİRME SÜREÇLERİ VE 
BASEL II UZLAŞISI 
Cihangir, Nuran  
Yüksek Lisans, Finansal Ekonomi Bölümü 
Tez Danışmanı: Doç. Dr. Ege Yazgan 
Aralık, 2007, 92 sayfa 
Bu çalışma Turkiye’de yerleşik spesifik bir finans kuruluşunun kredi değerlendirme 
süreçlerini analiz etmekte ve kurumsal kredi kararlarının ana etmenlerini Moody’s 
derecelendirme kuruluşunun özel şirket firmalarına ilişkin model parametreleriyle 
karşılaştırmaktadır. Yeni “Uluslararası Sermaye Ölçümlenmesi ve Standartları 
Uzlaşısı” ya da Basel II’nin bankacılık sektörüne kredi değerlendirme süreçleri 
açısından yeni uygulamalar getireceği öngörülmektedir. Bankacılık Düzenleme ve 
Denetleme Kurumu’nun en son tarihli Bankacılık Sektörü Gelişim Raporu Türk 
Bankaları’nın halen Basel II uygulaması konusunda başlangıç aşamasında 
olduklarını öne sürmektedir, ki Basel II global olarak finansal istikrarın sağlanmasına 
çalışmaktadır. Verimliliği, özellikle yakın tarihte meydana gelen uluslararası tutsat 
krizi sonrasında finansal piyasalarda oluşan dalgalanmanın sonucunda 
tartışılmaktadır. Basel II – Standart Yaklaşım’ın Türk Bankacılık Sektörü’nün 
çoğunluğu tarafından uygulanması beklenmektedir. Bu yaklaşım dışsal 
derecelendirme kuruluşlarının ratinglerinin kredi değerlendirme süreçlerinde 
kullanılmasına yol açacaktır ve her bir kredi borçlusunun ve kredi faaliyetinin banka 
kredi ilişkisine girmeden önce bir rating derecesi sahibi olmasını gerekli kılmıştır.  
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Yukarıda belirtilen hedeflere ulaşmak amacıyla, bu çalışmada öncelikle Basel II 
uzlaşısı ve kredi değerlendirme süreçleri açısından Turkiye’deki uygulaması 
hakkında bilgi verilmiştir. Buna ek olarak, finansal kurumun kredi karar (kabul ya da 
red) verisini modellemek amacıyla logit ve probit regresyon modelleri sunulmuştur. 
Bu modeller en çok kullanılan modeller arasında olup, Basel II’de bankaların içsel 
kredi değerlendirme ve skorlama süreçlerindeki en iyi uygulamalar arasında 
bahsedilmektedirler.  
Moody’s’in modeliyle karşılaştırmak için parametrelere ilişkin verilerin tamamı elde 
edilememiş olmasına rağmen, sonuçlar kalitatif ve /veya yargısal içerikli bilginin 
finansal kurumun karar süreçlerinde önemli rol oynadığına işaret etmektedir. 
Moody’s tarafından uygulanan ana kriterler olan, borçluluk ya da finansal kaldıraç 
oranları, büyüklüğe ilişkin veriler, likidite rasyoları yetersiz açıklayıcılığa sahip 
değişkenler olarak bulunmuştur. Diğer ana kriter, karlilik oranı, yalnızca logit 
modelinde yüksek açıklayıcılığa sahiptir. Öte yandan, firmanın içinde bulunduğu 
sektör (tekstil hariç) değişkeni kredi onay kararında düşük açıklayıcılığa sahiptir, ki 
Moody’s’in modelinde de bir parametre olarak yer almamaktadir. ‘Binary’ değişken 
‘Tekstil’ her iki modelde de yüksek açıklayıcılıklı değişkendir. Dolayısıyla, modeller 
finansal kurumların tekstil sektöründe yer alan firmalara karşı seçici davranması 
konusunda anlamlı bir sonuca varmıştır, ki tekstil sektörü firmaları yakın zamanlarda 
çeşitli güçlüklerle karşı karşıya kalmıştır. Faaliyet rasyoları, satış büyüme rakamları 
ve denetim kalitesi faktörleri Moody’s tarafından kullanılmasına rağmen, ilişkin 
verinin elde edilememesi ya da sağlıklı olmaması nedeniyle bu faktörler calışmaya 
dahil edilememiştir. Moody’s yukarıda bahsedilen rasyo ve kriterlerin finansal 
kurumlarca kullanılmasını önermektedir. Dolayısıyla, Basel II’nin uygulanmasıyla bu 
parametrelerin derecelendirme ve kredi karar modellerinde kriter haline gelmesi 
beklenmektedir. Basel II - İçsel Derecelendirme Yaklaşımı’nın uygulanması, 
derecelendirme kuruluşlarının benzeri modellerin finansal kurumlar tarafından içsel 
olarak oluşturulmasına neden olacaktır.  
Anahtar Kelimeler: Kredi Değerlendirme Süreçleri, Basel II, Gelişmekte Olan 
Ülkeler, Kurumsal Krediler, Probit, Logit, Binary Seçim Modelleri.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION AND REVIEW OF 
LITERATURE 
1.1 Introduction 
This study analyses the credit assessment processes of a specific financial 
institution in Turkey and compares the main drivers of corporate credit approval 
decisions with the parameters of Moody’s rating model for private companies, 
RiskCalc. The new “International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital 
Standards” or Basel II is expected to bring new applications in terms of credit 
assessment processes to the banking sector.  
To reach the underlined objectives of the study, firstly Basel II framework and its 
application in Turkey in terms of credit assessment processes are presented. As a 
consequence of the recent sub-prime mortgage crisis in the USA and spread into 
other markets, risk management became an even more central topic in finance. 
Similarly, liberalisation and deregulation of financial markets, globalisation, and ever 
more complex financial products already made it necessary to have appropriate and 
enforced regulations. Their aim is to improve risk management practices, and 
through that, to ensure sound, stable and well functioning financial institutions and 
markets, and ultimately, prevent the occurrence of financial crisis. With this objective 
in mind, the new “International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital 
Standards” (or Basel II-accord) has been developed. The accord brings together 
best practices and emphasises the requirement of a higher capital base in relation 
to a higher risk portfolio. Currently, its effectiveness is subject to global debate, as it 
could not prevent the mortgage crisis. 
“Credit” or “default” risk is one of the main risks described in the Basel II framework, 
defined as the probability that the counterparty is not able to appropriately fulfil its 
loan obligation. As default is costly, financial institutions construct and implement a 
system to separate “good” from “bad” risk. These risks are then classified in a 
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number of different risk “buckets”, with the credit in each bucket differing in terms of 
pricing and capital allocation. Those risk buckets are called “rating” and the 
classification system applied by the institution is named as “rating system”. The new 
Basel Accord prescribes financial institutions to use either external ratings of rating 
companies, i.e. standard approach, or internal ratings of the institution, i.e. internal 
ratings based approach (IRB).  
Financial institutions traditionally use the opinion or judgment of internal or external 
experts to differentiate between risks. Because of the complexity of the data 
involved, humans have over the years gradually been replaced by statistical models. 
Yet, because of the remaining limitations of these models, final conclusions are still 
drawn by experts. In addition, financial institutions have decision making or scoring 
processes. These are either statistical, expert judgment based or constrained 
expert-judgment based, depending on the degree of reliance on the expert 
judgment. Basel II encourages the financial institutions to have one or more 
statistical based credit assessment models for different credit segments.   
Secondly, in order to model the credit decision data of the financial institution -
whether to accept a loan application or not- logit and probit regression models are 
presented. Those models are among the most practiced methods and mentioned in 
the Basel II framework as the best practices of the banks in their internal credit 
assessment and credit scoring processes.  
Since the rating companies’ ratings will be the basis for  Basel II-Standard Approach 
and similar models as those of the rating companies are being or will be constructed 
internally by the financial institutions within the Basel II transition process. With the 
Basel II implementation, it is forecasted that those parameters already used by the 
rating companies will be utilised by financial institutions in their rating and credit 
decision models. The study discusses the model used for the empirical research and 
the parameters estimated by it. The results are compared with the variables of the 
Moody’s’ private company rating model. In addition, by the quantitative information 
provided by the institution  through an interview, properties of the rating system of 
the financial institution are analysed. Finally, conclusions and comparisons are 
drawn regarding the predictive performance of logit and probit regression models.  
The first chapter of this thesis focuses on the theoretical developments and 
statistical methodology in credit and default prediction models. Chapter 2 provides 
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an overview of the Basel II- Accord, its development and its application in credit risk 
management in Turkey. Chapter 3 introduces the binary choice models. In Chapter 
4 the empirical research and the credit assessment process of the analyzed 
financial institution are described. The data set and (estimated) model parameters 
are presented, while also the performance of both models is compared. The results 
are compared with the variables of the Moody’s’ private company rating model. In 
addition, characteristics of the rating system of the analysed financial institution are 
observed. Finally, in Chapter 5 the conclusions are drawn.  
1.2 Review of Literature 
Theoretical Developments in Modelling and Statistical Methodology 
Credit granting decision and default probability estimation has been among the most 
researched topics in credit modelling starting from the 1930´s.  
The studies by Ramser and Foster (1931) [8], Fitzpatrick (1932) [6], Winakor and 
Smith (1935) [9], and Merwin (1942) [7] were among the first research that predicted 
the defaults of firms by using financial ratio information. Those studies laid the 
principals of default prediction research. 
During the first research stages of failure prediction (eg. Fitzpatrick, 1932), there 
were no advanced statistical methods or computers available for the researchers. 
The financial ratios of failed and non-failed firms were compared and it was 
concluded that they were poor for the former ones.  
 In 1963, Myers and Forgy [13] compared scorecards built using regression analysis 
and discriminant analysis. 
Afterwards, Beaver [35] in 1966, realised one of the most significant studies 
concerning ratio analysis. A fundamental change in research tradition took place 
when he presented the univariate analysis approach. His objective was to predict 
the timely payment ability of loans by using likelihoods. Here to, he used for the first 
time a matched sample of failed and non-failed firms in a univariate discriminant 
analysis, in order to avoid sample bias. It was concluded that several ratios differed 
significantly between failed and non-failed firms, especially cash flow/net worth and 
debt/net worth ratios. Beaver indicated that the differences in some of the most used 
ratios eg. “debt to net worth” and “cash flow to assets” ratios between failed and 
viable firms became higher as the time to failure shortened. 
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Then, Altman [10] extended this analysis into multivariate analysis in 1968. In his 
model, which is called Z-Score, he used linear combination of ratios and a 
discriminant function. A set of informative parameters, all powerful in a univariate 
sense but not perfectly correlated, are used. The data set is composed of 79 
defaulted and a similar number of non-defaulted companies. The study, out of the 
matched sample, predicted 95% of the data correctly. Therefore Altman’s Z-Score 
has gained benchmark status in the academic literature and among accounting and 
financial analysis textbooks.1 Until the 1980’s, discriminant analysis was the 
dominant method in failure prediction. After the univariate analysis of Beaver, 
Altman (1968) pioneered the use of multivariate approach in the context of 
bankruptcy models. After the Altman study the multivariate approach became 
dominant in bankruptcy models.  
Discriminant analysis tries to derive the linear combination of two or more 
independent variables that will discriminate best between a priori defined groups, 
such as failing and viable companies. This is achieved by the statistical decision rule 
of maximising the between-group variance relative to the within group variance. This 
relationship is expressed as the ratio of the two. 
Discriminant analysis performs very well provided that the variables in every group 
follow a multivariate normal distribution and the covariance matrices for every group 
are equal. However, empirical experiments have shown that, especially failing firms 
violate the normality condition. In addition, the equal group variances condition is 
also violated. Moreover, multicollinearity among independent variables is often a 
serious problem, especially when stepwise procedures are employed (Hair et al., 
1992 [36]). However, empirical studies have proved that the problems connected 
with normality assumptions were not weakening its classification capability, but its 
prediction ability.  
The two most frequently used methods in the discriminant models have been the 
simultaneous (direct) method and the stepwise method. The former is based on 
model construction by e.g. theoretical grounds, so that the model is ex ante defined 
and then used in discriminant analysis. When the stepwise method is applied, the 
procedure selects a subset of variables to produce a good discrimination model 
using forward selection, backward elimination, or stepwise selection. 
                                               
1
 e.g., Lovie and Lovie (1986), Casey and Bartczak (1985), Zavgren (1984).  
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The studies by Deakin (1972)[37],  Edminster (1972)[38], Blum (1974) [11], Altman 
et al.  (1977) [39] and El Hennawy and Morris (1983) [40] are representative 
examples of studies that used a multiple discriminant analysis technique. 
Pinches and Mingo [14] and Harmelink [15] applied discriminant analysis in order to 
assign ratings for the bonds in 1973. In their study, they also made use of 
accounting data and ratios.  
In the following year, Blum [11] analysed the financial ratios concerning profitability 
and liquidity of 230 companies, half of which is failed and the remaining non-failed. 
The result of the study demonstrated that 95% of observations, which were related 
to the period one year prior to default- classified by the model correctly. The 
prediction power decreased to 70% at the third, fourth and fifth years prior to default.  
In addition to the discriminant analysis technique in the 1960’s, there were also the 
time varying decision making models. Those models aimed to avoid unrealistic 
situations by modelling the applicants’ default probability varying over time. The first 
study on such models was done by Cyert et al. [16]. The following research was by 
Mehta [17], Bierman and Hausman [18], Long [19], Corcoran [20], Kuelen [21], 
Srinivasan and Kim [22], and Philosophov et al [23].  
In 1962, Cyert et al. [16] by means of a total balance aging procedure built a 
decision making process to estimate doubtful accounts. In this method, the 
customers were assumed to move to different credit states through stationary 
transition matrix. By this model, the loss expectancy rates could be estimated by 
aging category.  
In 1968, Mehta [24] used a sequential process to build a credit extension policy and 
established a controlling system measuring the policy effectiveness. The system 
continues with the evaluation of the acceptance and rejection costs alternatives. The 
alternatives with minimum expected costs were chosen. In 1970, Mehta [17] related 
the process with a Markov process as suggested by Cyert et al. [16] to include time 
varying states in order to optimize credit policy. Dynamic relationships, when 
evaluating alternatives, were taken into account with Markov chains.  
In 1970, Bierman and Hausman [18] developed dynamic programming decision 
rules by using prior probabilities that were assumed to have a beta distribution. The 
decision was taken by evaluating costs not only including today’s loss but also the 
expected future profit loss.  
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Myers (1977) [41] has outlined a theoretical model which found out that investors 
will choose to liquidate if the company’s liquidation value exceeds its going-concern 
value.   
Dombolena and Khoury in 1980 [12] further improved the discriminant analysis 
model by adding the stability measures of the ratios, such as standard deviation of 
ratios, coefficient of variations and standard error of estimates. Prediction power of 
the model reached 78% even five years prior to default. Among the others standard 
deviation was the strongest stability indicator.  
The same year Wiginton [28] compared logistic regression and discriminant analysis 
and concluded that logistic regression performs better than discriminant analysis.  
In 1985, Altman, Frydman and Kao [42] introduced the recursive partitioning 
algorithm.  
Altman’s study (1986) [4] concluded that a company’s probability of failure 
increases, if it is unprofitable, highly leveraged, and/or suffers cash flow difficulties.  
The following year Pantalone and Platt [43] applied logistic regression in their 
research. In their classification the accuracy ratio was 98% for the failed firms, 
whereas 92% for the non-defaulted firms.  
The beginning of the 1990s was the start of the machine age. Odom and Sharda 
[44] compared discriminant analysis in 1990 and neural networks while using the 
explanatory variables in the research of Altman in 1968.  
The same year Gilbert et al. [45] showed that a bankruptcy model developed with 
random sample composed of bankrupted company data is able to distinguish firms 
that fail from other financially distressed firms through a stepwise logistic regression.  
Similarly, the following year Cadden, Coats and Fant made the comparison between 
the logistic regression and discriminant analysis approaches. After that, in 1992, 
Tam and Kiang [46] also compared logistic regression and discriminant analysis. In 
their study they used 18 variables. The following year, Coats and Fant [47] applied 
Altman’s variables (1968) to a panel data. Neural networks produced a improved 
result in this study.  
In 1996, Back, Laitinen, Sere and Wesel [48] did empirical work with 31 variables. In 
1998 Kiviluoto [49] modelled by using 6 variables and compared different 
approaches. The following year Laitinen and Kankaanpaa [50] made a comparison 
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between logistic regression, discriminant analysis, recursive partitioning, survival 
analysis and neural networks. Only 3 ratios are used in the latter analysis. The 
neural network provided the best results one year prior to failure, but recursive 
partitioning performed best two and three years prior to default. The same year, 
Muller and Ronz [51] applied a semi-parametric generalised partial linear model for 
the first time, using 24 variables.  
Another important study was performed in 1998 by Carling, Jacobson and 
Roszbach [30]. They used a Tobit model with a variable censoring threshold, in 
order to observe the effects of survival time. From the distribution of conditional 
expected durations of loans a distribution of expected profits were calculated. Unlike 
the credit scoring models, which merely predict default probabilities, it is based on 
an evaluation of expected profitability. This provided improved insight into the 
efficiency of current bank lending.  
In 2000, McKee and Greenstein [52] applied recursive partitioning, neural networks 
and discriminant analysis and used 6 ratios as explanatory variables.  The same 
year Cames and Hill [31] used logit, probit, gombit and weibit models and analysed 
whether the predictive ability is affected by observing the underlying probability 
distribution of the dependent variable. It was concluded that there was no significant 
difference between the models.  
In 2003 [32] Hayden analysed univariate regression for three different default 
definitions, two of which are from Basel II and one being a traditional definition. The 
result demonstrated that there was no significant difference in prediction power 
when different default definitions are used.  
Huyen [33] and Thanh made a study about Vietnam’s retail banking market and a 
stepwise logistic regression is applied as a modelling tool to build a scoring model.  
Table 1.1 summarises 31 financial ratios generally used in the respective theoretical 
& empirical studies.  
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Table 1.1 Financial ratios found to be well-performing in previous default risk 
studies  
Ratios Study 
R1  Cash/Current Liabilities L E, D 
R2  Cash Flow/Current Liabilities L E 
R3  Cash Flow/Total Assets L E-M 
R4  Cash Flow/Total Debt L Bl, B, D 
R5  Cash/Net Sales L D 
R6  Cash/Total Assets L D 
R7  Current Assets/Current Liabilities L M, B, D, A-HN 
R8  Current Assets/Net Sales L D 
R9  Current Assets/Total Assets L D,E-M 
R10 Current Liabilities/Equity L E 
R11 Equity/Fixed Assets S F 
R12 Equity/Net Sales S R-F, E 
R13 Inventory/Net Sales L E 
R14 Long Term Debt/Equity S E-M 
R15 MV of Equity/Book Value of Debt S A, A-H-N 
R16 Total Debt/Equity S M 
R17 Net Income/Total Assets P B, D 
R18 Net Quick Assets/Inventory L Bl 
R19 Net Sales/Total Assets P R-F, A 
R20 Operating Income/Total Assets P A, T, A-H-N 
R21 EBIT/Total Interest Payments L A-H-N 
R22 Quick Assets/Current Liabilities L D, E-M 
R23 Quick Assets/Net Sales L D 
R24 Quick Assets/Total Assets L D, T, E-M 
R25 Rate of Return to Common Stock P Bl 
R26 Retained Earnings/Total Assets P A, A-H-N 
R27 Return on Stock P F, T 
R28 Total Debt/Total Assets S B, D 
R29 Working Capital/Net sales L E, D 
R30 Working Capital/Equity L T 
R31 Working Capital/Total Assets L W-S,M,B,A,D 
Type : L=liquidity, P=profitability, S=solidity 
Legend: 
A Altman 1968 
A-H-N Altman, Haldeman, and Narayanan 1977 
B Beaver 1966 
Bl Blum 1974 
D Deakin 1972 
E Edminster 1972 
E-M El Hennawy and Morris 1983 
F Fitzpatrick 1932 
M Merwin 1942 
R-F Ramser and Foster 1931 
W-S Winakor and Smith 1935 
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CHAPTER 2  
THE BASEL II ACCORD AND CREDIT RISK  
This chapter consists of a theoretical review of the Basel II framework together with 
its application in Turkey in terms of credit assessment processes. First of all, a short 
overview of the Accord’s history and objectives are presented and the reasons for its 
construction are discussed. Then, it is compared with the previous accord, Basel I, 
and the main factors leading to a new accord are presented. Next, three pillars of 
Basel II concerning credit risk are discussed. Internal rating models are presented 
and statistical models and expert judgement based models are compared. Capital 
requirements in different approaches to capital are discussed. Afterwards, critics to 
Basel II and its application globally and specifically in Turkey are presented. Finally, 
the possible effects of Basel II to Turkish Banking Sector and current credit 
assessment practices of Turkey are evaluated.  
2.1 Reasons for new rules of equity 
The 1970s financial crisis brought the issue of regulatory supervision of 
internationally active banks to the fore2. As a result of this, the Basel Committee has 
been created in 1974 by the Central Banks of 10 countries (G-10). This was mainly a 
response to the failure of the Franklin National Bank in New York and the Herstatt 
Bank in Germany, that had significant adverse implications for both foreign exchange 
markets and banks in other countries.3 Both events demonstrated that the failure of 
even a moderately sized bank could have implications beyond national boundaries 
and outside the competence of national supervisory authorities. Thus, armed with the 
recognition that banks with cross-border operations posed special risks, the Basel 
                                               
2
 www.bis.org/about/history.  
3
 Geoge G. Kaufman, Basel II: The Roar that Moused, 2003, p.2.  
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Committee has been working to improve bank supervision at the international level.4 
The Committee's members come from Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, 
Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United 
Kingdom and the United States. The countries are represented by their Central Bank 
and also by the authority with formal responsibility for the prudential supervision of 
banking business where this is not the Central Bank.5  
The Committee first focused on facilitating and enhancing information sharing and 
cooperation among banking regulators in major countries, at the same time 
developing principles for the supervision of internationally active large banks.6 As 
losses at some large international banks from loans to less-developed countries 
mounted in the late 1970’s, the Committee became increasingly concerned that the 
potential failures of one or more of these banks could have serious adverse effects: 
Those effects would not only impact on the other banks in their own countries, but 
also on counterparty banks in other countries. The Committee feared that large 
banks lacked sufficient capital in relation to the risks they were assuming. Another 
fear was that this capital inadequacy, largely caused the national governments to be 
reluctant to require higher capital ratios. This practice might put the banks in their 
own countries at a competitive disadvantage, relative to the ones in other countries.  
In the 1980’s this concern was particularly directed towards Japanese banks, as a 
result of financial deregulation. Those banks were rapidly expanding globally, based 
on valuations of capital that included large amounts of unrealized capital gains from 
rapid increases in the values of Japanese stocks that they owned. Such gains were 
not included in the capital valuations of Japanese Banks. However, in most other 
countries equity ownership by banks were more restrictive and these gains had to be 
included in the capital valuations. Partially as a result, the Committee began to focus 
more on developing international regulation that centred on higher and more uniform 
bank capital standards across countries. 7 
At the beginning of 1990s, many loan takers became insolvent, which resulted in a 
drastic reduction of equity within the banks. The banking sector became more aware 
that bank equity should be able to cover unexpected operational and / or 
                                               
4
 Smitha Francis, The revised capital accord: The logic, content and potential impact for 
developing countries, 2006, p. 2.  
5
 www.bis.org/bcbs.  
6
 Herring and Litan, 1995.  
7
 Geoge G. Kaufman, Basel II: The Roar that Moused, 2003, p.3. 
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international risks. The equity coverage was not sufficient, and this created essential 
risks for the banks. Some banks could not manage to compensate the big losses 
resulting from mentioned credit defaults and therefore bankrupted. Moreover, 
uniform competition rules were needed, since many banks started to operate at 
international level. 8  
On one hand, the capital requirement can limit the possibility for a bank to provide 
loans since its provision should be sufficient to cover losses. If this provision is not 
adequate, this will create a problem of insolvency. Adequately capitalised and well-
managed banks are better placed to withstand losses and to provide credit to 
customers throughout all business cycles. The major challenge has always been to 
determine how much capital is needed to create a sufficient buffer against future 
unexpected losses. If capital levels are too low, banks may be unable to absorb high 
levels of losses and thereby increase the risk of bank failures, which may put 
depositors’ funds at risk. 9 
On the other hand, if the provision amount is too high then banks face with a “Credit 
Crunch”. Numerous banks already faced this “Credit Crunch”. 10. Credit Crunch is 
defined as a sudden reduction in the availability of loans or credit, which may be due 
to increased perception of risk, a change in monetary conditions, or even an 
imposition of credit controls. Such an effect in the financial markets is being currently 
discussed after the recent mortgage crisis.  
Furthermore, as in the case of a bank, a company also needs to have sufficient 
provision in case of a negative downturn in the economy or negative market 
conditions. The bank will provide a loan by evaluating the financial situation of a 
company or the company should be able to repay the loan it obtained from a bank 
and hence the financial healthiness of the company is important for the bank, too.  
Hence, The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision aimed at bringing discipline for 
borrowers (bank’s clients) and lenders (the bank itself) and provide a risk weighted 
system that reflects the loss history of a specific company or a bank and the type of 
loan 11 via the new rules of equity. In addition, the Basel Committee on Banking 
                                               
8
 Cluse (2005-a), pp.19-24.  
9
 www.pwc.com, The challenges of the new capital accord, your money and the new capital 
accord for the banks, p. 1. 
10
 Worldbank (2005), pp.112-113.  
11
 Jacobson/ Lindé/Roszbach (2004), p.2.  
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Supervision  ensures the financial stability 12 by reducing the systematic risk, which 
effects the overall market. Basel Committee develops regulations, standards, codes 
and rules that may be applicable in both developed and developing countries.13 This 
aim is common with those of the other financial organisations such as International 
Organisations of Securities Commissions and International Association of Insurance 
Supervisors.  Therefore, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision tries “to arrive 
at systematically more risk sensitive capital requirements for the stability of the 
financial system. 14 This is linked to the risk of lending and the right amount of 
provision. The capital requirement should reduce the risk of non-solvability or the 
credit risk. This will be done effectively if the bank manages this risk on two levels: It 
needs to manage both its credit risk (on the bank’s level) and on the client’s level, 
this will cover the bank’s future losses. 15 Thus, the new rules of equity should create 
a discipline both for the banks and the clients (debtors).  
2.2 Basel I Capital Accord 
The Basel I Capital Accord was announced in 1988 and implemented in 1992. It is 
considered to be a major breakthrough in the international convergence of 
supervisory regulations concerning capital adequacy. Promoting the soundness and 
stability of the international banking system and ensuring a level playing field for 
internationally active banks were its main objectives. Basel I was an important 
advance that resulted in higher capital levels, more equitable international markets 
and closer links between banks’ capital holdings and the risks they take. 16 Minimum 
capital requirements for credit risk were imposed, though individual supervisory 
authorities had discretion to define other types of risks or apply stricter standards. It 
was initially intended for internationally active banks in G-10 countries, but it was 
finally accepted as a global standard and adopted by over 100 countries, including 
places like Tanzania. Therefore, it became a sector standard. The framework defined 
the components of “regulatory capital” and set the risk weights for four different 
“classes” of on- and off-balance sheet exposures. The risk weights, which were 
intentionally kept to a minimum, demonstrated relative credit riskiness across 
                                               
12
 Feig (2005), pp. 18-19. 
13
 Kern (2006-b), p. 79. 
14
 Lamy (2006), p. 160. 
15
 Kidwell / Blackwell / Whidbee / Peterson (2006), pp. 425-426.  
16
 Ben S. Bernanke (15/06/2006)- Modern risk management and banking supervision 
(Central Bank Article and Speeches), p.1 
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different types of exposures. Exposures to the same kind of borrowers (such as all 
balances with other banks or exposures to all corporate borrowers) were subject to 
the same capital requirement. 17 The minimum ratio of regulatory capital to total risk-
weighted assets (RWA) was set at 8%, of which the “core capital” element (a more 
restrictive definition of eligible capital known as Tier 1 capital) would be at least 4%. 
The most important amendment to the framework took place in 1996, when after 
three years of pre-study market risk was also included in the capital adequacy ratio 
calculation. This was the last revision to the document, although the definition of 
assets and capital has further evolved over the years parallel with financial 
innovation.  
Even though the Basel I framework helped to “level the playing field” and to stabilize 
the declining trend in banks’ capital adequacy ratios, it had also some drawbacks 
and they became more and more evident over time. These problems can be 
summarised as follows: 
a) Inadequate risk differentiation in loan categories:  
The major criticism to Basel I was that it didn’t recognise the potential differences in 
the creditworthiness and risks that each individual exposure within a class of 
exposures might pose. For example, weights did not sufficiently differentiate credit 
risk by counterparty (i.e. financial strength) or loan (e.g. pledged collateral, 
covenants, maturity) characteristics. Indeed, the capital charge for all corporate 
exposures was the same without taking into account the rating of the borrower. This 
implied that banks with the same capital adequacy ratio (CAR) could have very 
different risk profiles and risk exposures.  
b) No weight to any gains from diversification: 
Basel I measured credit risk as the sum of the credit risks of the individual asset 
components and gave no weight to any gains from diversification across correlated 
assets18. Indeed, Basel I is based on the ‘building blocks’ approach. Therefore; there 
is no distinction or difference in capital treatment between a well-diversified loan 
portfolio from one that is very concentrated, even though portfolio theory recognizes 
the risk reduction benefits from diversification. 
                                               
17
 www.pwc.com, The challenges of the new capital accord, your money and the new capital 
accord for the banks, p. 1.  
18
 Geoge G. Kaufman, Basel II: The Roar that Moused, 2003, p.4. 
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c) Inappropriate measurement of sovereign risk: 
In Basel I, capital allocation for credit risk is based on the criteria that the 
counterparty or exposure is within an OECD country or not, the so-called “Club 
Rule”. Lending to OECD governments became more attractive since it required no 
regulatory capital charge, even though this group included countries with 
substantially different credit ratings such as Turkey, Mexico and South Korea. Claims 
to the national government also had a zero risk weight, and this motivated many 
banks, especially in developing countries, to ignore portfolio diversification rules and 
lend heavily to their sovereigns.  
d) Lack or shortage of emphasis on other risk types:  
Basel I is also often criticised due to lack of emphasis on other risk types (e.g. 
interest rate, operational, business, reputation) and on financial infrastructure issues 
(e.g. accounting, legal framework). In addition, it is discussed that it did not provide 
adequate incentives to encourage complementary improvements in banks’ risk 
assessment systems. As a result of this, a high capital adequacy ratio was often over 
relied upon. 
The shortcomings of Basel I meant that regulatory capital ratios were increasingly 
becoming less meaningful as measures of true capital adequacy, particularly for 
larger, more complex institutions. In addition, various types of products like 
securitizations were developed primarily as a form of regulatory capital arbitrage to 
overcome those rules. Finally, the state of risk measurement and management 
evolved significantly in the last years, allowing many banks to develop their own 
sophisticated internal economic capital models to guide business decisions. The of 
regulatory capital measurement relegated to primarily a legal reporting, compliance 
and public relations exercise. This had the perverse effect of distancing bank 
supervisors from the actual risk assessment process and the manner in which those 
banks were run. In fact, Basel I ratios in many cases formed the sole legal basis for 
taking supervisory action.  
2.3 Basel II Accord  
In mid-2004 the Basel Committee members agreed on “International Convergence of 
Capital Measurement and Capital Standards” (Basel II). This happened after 
extensive consultations with involved parties and quantitative impact studies. The 
first draft proposals had been circulated to supervisory authorities between 1999 and 
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2003.   
Basel II has new rules for calculating risk weights and the supervision of financial 
institutions. The most important difference, from the viewpoint of credit risk, consists 
in the estimation of minimum capital requirements. The 1988 Accord stated that 
banks should have minimum CAR of 8%. In Basel II, the estimation is more closely 
related to rating grades within the bank’s lending portfolio .  
The main objective of the new framework is to further strengthen the soundness and 
stability of the international banking system. This is done through the adoption of 
stronger risk management practices by the banking sector, bringing regulatory 
capital requirements more in line with (and thus codifying) current good practices in 
banking. This will be achieved by making credit capital requirements significantly 
more risk-sensitive and by introducing an operational risk capital charge. The 
intention is to broadly maintain the aggregate level of capital requirements, but 
provide incentives to adopt the more advanced risk-sensitive approaches of the 
revised framework. These changes are implemented by adjusting the definition of 
RWA (i.e., the denominator of the CAR) while leaving most of the other elements of 
Basel I untouched, such as the focus on accounting data, the definition of eligible 
capital, the 8% minimum CAR requirement and the 1996 market risk amendment to 
the Capital Accord.  
For banks adopting the Internal Rating Based Approach (IRB) for credit risk or the 
Advanced Measurement Approach (AMA) for operational risk, there will be a capital 
floor following the implementation of the framework as an interim prudential 
arrangement.  
Compared to Basel I, the scope of application is broader and includes, on a fully 
consolidated basis, all major internationally active banks at every tier within a 
banking group (i.e. full sub-consolidation), as well as at the level of the group’s 
holding company. Supervisors also need to ensure that individual banks within the 
group remain adequately capitalized on a stand-alone basis. Consolidation must 
capture, to the greatest extent possible, all banking and relevant financial activities 
(both regulated and unregulated) with the exception of insurance. Significant minority 
investments where control does not exist, as determined by national accounting 
and/or regulatory practices, will either be deducted from equity or consolidated on a 
pro-rata basis. However, significant minority and majority investments in commercial 
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entities that exceed certain materiality levels (subject to some national discretion) will 
be deducted from banks’ capital.   
Basel II consists of three pillars: minimum capital requirements, supervisory review of 
capital adequacy and market discipline. These pillars are presented in the following 
section and summarised in Table 2.1.  
Table 2.1 Three Pillars of Basel II  
BASEL II CAPITAL ACCORD19     
1. Minimum Capital 
Requirements 
2. Supervisory Review of Capital 
Adequacy 3. Market Discipline 
-Sets minimum acceptable 
capital level 
- Banks must access solvency 
versus risk profile 
- Improved disclosure 
of capital structure 
-Enhanced approach for credit 
risk 
- Supervisory review of banks' 
calculations and capital 
strategies 
- Improved disclosure 
of risk measurement 
practices 
- Public ratings - Banks should hold in excess of 
minimum level of capital 
- Improved disclosure 
of risk profile 
- Internal ratings 
- Regulators will intervene at an 
early stage if capital levels 
deteriorate 
-Improved disclosure 
of capital adequacy 
- Mitigation   
- Explicit treatment of 
Operational Risk   
- Market Risk framework, 
capital, definition/ratios are 
unchanged 
    
2.3.1 Pillar 1: Minimum Capital Requirements 
Pillar 1 sets principles for minimum capital requirements to cover both credit and 
operational risks. The Committee proposes to allow banks a choice between two 
broad methodologies for calculating their capital requirements for credit risk. 
 
                                               
19
 Mercer Oliver Wyman “The New Rules of the Game- Implications of the New Basel Capital 
Accord for the European Banking Industries”.  
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2.3.1.1 Credit Risk- Standardised Approach 
In the standardised approach banks use the ratings of external rating institutions 
recognised by the national supervisory authorities in determining their risk weights. 
At national discretion, a lower risk weight may be applied to banks’ exposures to their 
sovereign (or central bank) denominated and funded in domestic currency. This 
clause is important for Turkey because the portion of securities issued by the Turkish 
Republic in bank assets is high.  
2.3.1.2 Credit Risk- Internal Ratings Based Approach (IRB) 
Rating and rating system 
A rating refers to a summary indicator of the risk inherent in an individual credit. 
Ratings typically embody an assessment of the risk of loss due to failure by a given 
borrower to pay as promised, based on consideration of relevant counterparty and 
facility characteristics. A rating system includes a conceptual methodology, 
management processes and systems that play a role in the assignment of a rating.  
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision describes two different types of rating 
systems. Respectively, the rating system can be calculated  with  information  from  
one  period (one  year) as a “point-in-time” (PIT) rating system or, in line with the 
Revised Framework, it can be calculated with information from a longer period, that 
is, a “through-the-cycle” (TTC) rating system. The latter rating system would 
consider long-run estimations of the probability of defaults (PD).  
1. “Point-in-time” (PIT) and “through-the-cycle” (TTC) rating systems  
The Revised Framework establishes that a borrower’s score must represent the 
bank’s  assessment  of  its  ability  and willingness to comply with the contract terms 
despite adverse economic conditions. This means that the bank should not just rely 
on present estimations of the PD but should also calculate PDs in stress scenarios 
with bad economic conditions or industry cycle. The PDs that incorporate stress 
scenarios of the business cycle are named “stressed PDs” and the PDs for a 
definite period of time are the “unstressed  PDs”.  The unstressed  PDs will change 
with economic conditions while stressed PDs will be relatively stable in economic  
cycles. The  main  idea  is  that stressed PDs are “cyclically neutral” - they move as 
obligors’ particular  conditions  change  but  they  do  not  respond  to changes in 
overall economic conditions.  
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A  rating  system  that  remains  relatively  constant  through different  business  
conditions  is  a “through-the-cycle” (TTC) rating system whilst a rating system that 
changes period by period is a “point-in-time” (PIT) rating system. Obligors in the 
same risk category of a PIT rating system would share similar unstressed PDs, and 
obligors in a risk category of a TTC rating system would share similar stressed PDs.   
Thus, the characteristics of PDs associated with each risk category are determined 
by the underlying rating system and the type of information used.  
The  information  needed  to  forecast  the  defaults  can  be aggregate information, 
which typically includes macroeconomic variables  such  as  GDP  growth  rates. 
The other possible variables are exchange  rates  and interest  rates,  as well as  
specific  obligor information that includes characteristics of and relevant financial 
information on obligors. A TTC  score  should take into  consideration  specific  
obligor characteristics plus macroeconomic conditions, but a PIT score would be 
based mainly on current information on obligors. 20 
In contrast to bank practice, external rating institutions such as Moody’s and Fitch 
rate TTC. They analyse the borrower ‘s current condition at least partly to obtain an 
anchor point for determining the severity of the downside scenario. The borrower’s 
projected condition in the event the downside scenario occurs, is the primary 
determinant of the rating. Only borrowers that are weak at the time of the analysis are 
rated primarily according to current condition. Under this philosophy, the migration of 
borrowers’ ratings up and down the scale as the overall economic cycle progresses will 
be muted: Ratings will change mainly for those firms that experience good or bad 
shocks that affect long-term conditions or financial strategy and for those whose 
original downside scenario was too optimistic. The agencies’ TTC philosophy probably 
accounts for their considerable emphasis on a borrower’s industry and its position 
within the industry. For many firms, industry supply and demand cycles are as 
important as or more important than the overall business cycle in determining cash 
flow.  21 
 
 
                                               
20
 Veronica Vallés, Central Bank of Argentina, Stability of a “through-the-cycle” rating system 
during a financial crisis, 2006, p.4-5.  
21
 William F. Treacy, Marc S. Carey, Credit Risk Rating at Large U.S. Banks, Federal 
Reserve Bulletin, 1998, p.899.  
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2. Main Characteristics of IRB  
An important  innovation  of  the  Revised Framework is the possibility of using 
internal rating systems as inputs for capital calculations after they have met minimum 
requirements set out in the document. The Revised  Framework  considers  that  
human  judgment should be used in the decision to grant loans but highlights the 
necessity of establishing a formal methodology to rate obligors and  to  estimate  the  
associated  PDs per rating class.  Thus,  it  describes methodologies  for  banks  to  
construct  their  IRB  systems.  Banks  may  use  IRB  systems  to calculate 
regulatory capital requirements but also as the basis for  internal  risk  measures. 
This implies that  they  will  use  these  risk measures  for  pricing,  managing  
portfolio  exposures  and establishing reserves. It is important that IRB systems 
accurately discriminate between bad and good obligors, in other words those that 
have higher and lower PD. The accuracy of the estimated PDs and the structure of 
the rating system would influence capital requirements.  
The IRB approach requires reporting an individual score for each obligor and an 
individual estimated PD. These are the inputs  for  constructing “risk  buckets”  or 
“risk  categories”.  
Obligors that share the same credit quality must be assigned to the same risk 
bucket. After grouping obligors in risk buckets, a pooled PD of the bucket must be 
calculated considering that it has to represent the risk of obligors within the group. 
This is basically a rating system. One important task is to establish the limit scores 
of risk buckets. The risk buckets’ delimitation could be based on a statistical model, 
on experts’ judgment or on both.  
The risk measures used to calculate capital requirements are the  probability  of  
default (PD),  loss-given-default (LGD), exposure at default (EAD) and effective 
maturity (M). There are two  IRB  approaches: foundation  and  advanced. Under  
both approaches, banks have to provide their own estimates of PD subject  to 
minimum  requirements. The  Revised  Framework specifies that all banks using IRB 
approaches must estimate a PD for each risk category of the rating system 
distinguishing between corporate, sovereign and bank exposures.  
The Revised Framework highlights that estimated PDs must be a long-run average 
of one-year PDs for borrowers in each category of the rating system.  
There are three fundamental components to calculate the minimum capital 
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requirement according to Basel II, respectively.  
a)  Probability of Default (PD): the likelihood that an applicant will default in a one 
year time period.  
b) Loss Given Default  (LGD): the proportion of the exposure that will be  
lost if the applicant defaults.  
c)  Exposure at Default (EAD): The nominal value of a loan granted.  
The minimum capital requirement (MCR) estimation is shown in the equation below 
with respect to Basel II:  
MCR = 0.08*RW*EAD = 0.08 RWA               (3.1) 
Here RW is the risk weight calculated by using PD, LGD and remaining maturity of 
exposure.  
The equation has specific formulas for each asset type. RWA is the risk weighted 
asset.  
EL = PD*EAD*LGD                 (3.2) 
MCL=EAD*LGD*PD-b*EL                (3.3) 
 
Where EL is the expected loss and b is the proportion of expected loss of loan 
covered by minimum capital requirement.  
There are two approaches to IRB, which are foundation and advanced IRB 
approaches. They differ primarily in terms of the inputs that are provided by the 
bank based on its own estimates and those that have been specified by the 
supervisor. In advanced IRB approach, the bank should provide its own estimates of 
PD, EAD, LGD and Maturity (M). On the other hand, in foundation IRB approach the 
bank provides PD based on its internal data, while it makes use of supervisory 
values set by the Basel Committee or at national discretion.   
2.3.1.3 PD Dynamics 
Probability of default is one of the most challenging factors that should be estimated 
while determining the minimum capital requirement. The new accord sets principles 
in estimating PD. According to Basel II, there are two definitions of default:  
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a)  The bank considers that the obligor is unlikely to pay its credit.  There are four 
main indicators that bank consider the obligor is unlikely to pay the obligation:  
• The bank puts the obligation on an non-accrued status  
• The bank sells the credit obligation at a material credit related economic  
loss.  
• The bank consents to a distressed restriction of credit obligation.  
• The obligor sought or has been placed in bankruptcy.  
b)  The obligor past due more than 90 days on credit obligation to the bank.  
Banks should have a rating system of its obligor with at least 7 grades having 
meaningful distribution of exposure. One of the grades should be for non-defaulted 
obligor and one for defaulted only.  For each grade there should be one PD estimate 
common for all individuals in that grade, which is called pooled PD. There are three 
approaches to estimate pooled PD: historical experience approach, statistical model 
approach, external mapping approach.  
Historical experience approach:  
In this approach, PD for the grade is estimated by using the historical observed data 
default frequencies. In other words, the proportion of defaulted obligors in a specific 
grade is taken as pooled PD.  
Statistical Model Approach  
In this approach, firstly predictive statistical models are used to estimate default 
probabilities of obligors. Then, for each grade the mean or median of PDs are taken 
as pooled PD.  
External Mapping Approach  
Through this method, firstly a mapping procedure is established to link internal 
ratings to external ratings. The pooled PD of external rating is assigned to internal 
rating by means of the mapping established in the first phase.  
Basel II allows the banks to use simple averages of one year default rates while 
estimating pooled PD.  
While establishing the internal rating process, the historical data should be at  
least 5 years, and the data used to build the model should be representative of the 
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population. Where only limiting data are available or limitations of assumptions of 
the techniques exist, banks should add the margins of conservatism in their PD 
estimates to avoid over-optimism. The margin of conservatism is determined 
according to the error rates of estimates depending on the performance of the 
models. There should be only one primary technique used to estimate PD, the other 
methods can be used just for comparison. Therefore, the best model should be 
taken as the primary model representing the data.  
After estimation of PDs, the rating classes need to be built.  In this segment the 
banks are allowed to use the scale of external institutions.  
In the PD estimation process, just building the model is not enough. Supervisors 
need to know not only the application but also the validity of the estimates. Banks 
should guarantee to the supervisor that the estimates are accurate and robust and 
the model has good predictive power. For this purpose, a validation process should 
be built.  
The scoring models are built by using a subset of available information. While 
determining the variables relevant for the estimation of PD, banks should use 
human judgment. Human judgment is also needed when evaluating and combining 
the results.  
2.3.1.4 Statistical Vs. Expert judgement Based Processes 
Rating or credit granting processes of banks and financial institutions can be divided 
into three out of the observations made in practice: Statistical-based, constrained 
expert judgement-based and expert judgement-based processes. These categories 
can be viewed as different points along a continuum defined by the degree of 
reliance on quantitative techniques. Indeed, scoring models can be considered on 
the one end of the continuum, and reliance on the personal experience and 
expertise of loan and credit officers, on the other. [1]  
1. Statistical-based processes 
When a default probability model or other quantitative tool is the basis for 
determining a rating or credit decision for counterparties and/or exposures within a 
certain credit portfolio then, the process is named as a statistical based process. 
Mentioned models may be developed internally by the Bank, financial institution or 
by vendors. These models are developed by making use of both quantitative (e.g., 
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financial ratios) and some qualitative but standardised (e.g., industry data, payment 
history, age, number of employees etc.) factors.  
Bank or financial institution first analyses and finds out the financial variables that 
seem to explain the default case, in order to construct a model. The bank estimates 
the effect of each of these variables on the payment default by considering the 
historical data of a sample of loans. The estimated coefficients are then applied to 
data for living loans to arrive at a score that is indicative of the probability of default; 
the score is then converted into a rating grade. Similarly, credit decisions of a bank 
or financial institution can be based on a decision model derived from the data 
related to past credit decisions. The data, in this case, needs to be similar to those 
to construct a default model. Since the purpose of a financial institution is to avoid 
defaults and/or maximize the profit through launched loans, credit decisions should 
reflect the probability of default of the counterparty or exposure.  
2. Constrained expert judgement-based processes 
In contrast to a purely mechanical and statistical based process, some financial 
institutions base their ratings mainly on statistical default and/or credit scoring 
models or financial analysis. In that case, they make use of objective and 
quantitative data, but allow the credit analyst to adjust the final rating to an explicitly 
limited degree, based on judgemental factors. For example, a scorecard determines 
the rating grade but credit analyst may adjust the final grade up or down by one or 
two grades or notches based on judgement. Similar application is that, quantitative 
and judgemental factors are explicitly assigned a maximum number of points, and 
therefore puts a limit to the effect of judgemental factors on the final rating.  
3. Processes based on expert judgement 
Some financial institutions are assigning ratings utilising significant judgemental 
factors, where the relative weight of such elements is not formally limited by the 
institution. Some of those use no statistical models at all, while some others 
consider it as a baseline rating that can be over passed by the credit analyst. In all 
processes based on unconstrained expert judgement, the analyst has unlimited 
discretion to significantly deviate from statistical model indications in assigning the 
grade.  
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Shortcomings of judgemental models 
Even though models and human judgement should always be used simultaneously, 
it is useful to acknowledge that judgemental models alone, from purely subjective to 
the most elaborate “expert-rule” systems dominate commercial loan analysis. This 
does not imply that quantitative information is not considered. When several 
quantitative inputs are analysed, the final judgement of this information is not 
transparent or easily validated.  
Vertical information, i.e. time series information, allows the researcher to at least say 
whether a company’s risk has gone up or down. Cross-sectional analysis is also 
useful relative values are important. For example, leverage can only be determined 
to be high if the leverage ratio’s average value is known. Given that some of these 
ratios vary systematically by industry, and also that analysts specialise in a 
particular industry, these benchmarks are usually taken from peer groups. This 
allows the analysts to say whether a company has high leverage and is therefore, 
on this dimension, risky. It is important for a credit analyst to determine the amount 
of risk relative to the portfolio, as absolute risk is often affected by factors that are 
too difficult to forecast.  
The bottom line is that data are generally presented in a way that facilitates 
assessing a firm’s trend, with a highly selective base for inter-company comparison. 
The problem is that without a multivariate model, one is often constrained to 
compare, sequentially, individual ratios, which often leads to ambiguous results. For 
example, if a firm is rated Aa in liquidity, Baa in profitability, B in leverage, the net 
result is unclear.  
It is generally presumed that given enough time most sufficiently intelligent and 
experienced analysts would outperform any model. The superiority of quantitative 
models may exist for cases where it does not pay enough to individually analysed 
loans, e.g. consumer loans, or when one has complex “option” information (as in a 
Merton model). However; with financial statements, the situation should be different. 
For example, quantitative models invariably focus upon a more restricted set of 
information than it is available to an analyst, which presumably creates an 
advantage for the analysis.  
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Certainly, many analysts are better than many models, and some analysts are 
better than all models. But what we want to know is whether a model developed with 
a significant numbers of defaults is better than average analyst.  
Both humans and models have limitations and biases. These biases include the 
following: people tend to overestimate the precision of their knowledge (Alpert and 
Raiffa (1982)); their overconfidence increases with the importance of the task; and 
finally, they recall information related to their successes more easily than 
information related to their failures (Barber and Odean (1999)).  
Libby (1975) provided empirical evidence in favour of quantitative models vs. 
judgement as applied to lending. He asked 16 loan officers from small banks and 27 
loan officers from large banks to judge which 30 of 60 firms would go bankrupt 
within three years of the financial statements with which they were presented. The 
loan officers requested five financial ratios on which to base their judgements. While 
they were correct 74% of the time, this was inferior to such simple alternatives as 
the liabilities / assets ratio.  
Apart from lending, there are many examples in which models outperformed the 
experts, including radiology diagnostics (Dawes and Corrigan (1974)).  
Paul Meehl (Clinical Versus Statistical Prediction,1954) reviewed evidence that 
while humans are good at finding important variables, they are not as good at 
integrating such diverse information sources optimally. Several subsequent reviews 
corroborate his initial findings (Sawyer (1966)).  
Another reason why quantitative models may outperform judgement in default 
forecasting is that analysis is usually not focused upon a strict default objective. 
Quantitative models are judged solely on their calibration and power. However, 
human analysis is focused more deeply on explaining individual assessments.  
The final competitive advantage of judgement is to focus upon areas where it adds 
the most value, as opposed to an undefined and unrestricted scope of analysis. 
Quantitative models should be support tools, not decision-making tools.  
A decision-making process that uses both quantitative information and judgement in 
a judicious way has the following characteristics:  
First, the quantitative information used is not presented as ratios and risk factors, 
but focuses upon one composite number. When several numbers are relied upon in 
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the final judgement, the aggregation of this information has so many possibilities. 
Therefore, any one person's summary judgement is basically subjective, not 
transparent or incomparable between individuals.  
Second, judgement is focused on exceptions and present conditions. For example, 
things known to be 'outside the model', such as knowledge that an export market 
has recently crashed or that a major competitor recently went out of business, 
should affect one's outlook as to the future viability of a company.  
Judgemental models and expert rules systems provide a useful way to integrate 
information about a company so that more complex refinements of any single score 
can be made in a disciplined manner. For statistical validation purposes, however, 
they are ambiguous, and in general inferior to more statistical methods.22 
Judgemental models are unable to handle a large number of applications [3]. 
However; by the development of classification models and ratio analysis, these 
models have been replacing the judgemental methods.  
2.3.1.5 Capital Requirements Under Different Approaches 
Figure 2.1 compares the different approaches to capital requirement. It displays that the 
better the credit scoring of the entity, the lower the Minimum Capital Requirement 
(MCR). It also indicates that MCR decreases for the rating classes higher than BB-, 
regarding Basel I and Basel II (IRB Approach). On the other hand, for the companies 
rated B+ or below, the MCR increases substantially, especially in IRB approach. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
22
 Moody’s Rating Methodology-RiskCalcTM for Private companies Moody’s Default Model, 
May 2000, p. 15-17. 
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Figure 2.1 Capital requirement under Basel I, Standardized and IRB approaches23 
 
 
Easier access to data about corporates will help banks to use the advanced and 
foundation IRB that require an extensive amount of information about companies in 
order to calculate their capital requirement. Since a young company or small or 
medium sized enterprise (SME) is less likely to have historical financial background, 
it would be more difficult for such a company to calculate capital requirement using IRB.  
2.3.2 Pillar 2: Supervisory Review Process 
Pillar 2 defines principles for supervisors to ensure adequate capital. Supervisors 
should expect banks to operate above minimum regulatory capital ratios and should 
have the ability to require banks to hold capital in excess of the minimum. Banks, on 
the other hand, should have a process to assess their overall capital adequacy 
compared to their risk profile and a strategy for maintaining their capital levels. This is 
due to the fact that there is a relation between capital required and the risk that the 
bank carries. 
Supervisors review and check the rating system and risk management of the banks. 
They review processes, to ensure that banks have adequate and valid techniques for 
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 Yeh / Twaddle / Frith (2005), p.9 
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capital requirements. Banks are expected to manage their internal capital. 
Supervisors should take appropriate supervisory action if they are not satisfied with 
the results of the risk management processes of the bank. 
When supervisors think the validity of the rating process is not adequate, they can 
take appropriate actions. They should, indeed, seek to intervene at an early stage to 
prevent capital from falling below the minimum levels required to support the risk 
characteristics of the bank. In addition, they should require rapid remedial action if 
capital is not maintained or restored. This pillar is a major concern for most 
regulators worldwide.  
2.3.3 Pillar 3: Market Discipline 
Pillar 3 sets principles about banks’ disclosure of information related to their risk.  It 
aims to maintain the market discipline by applying pillar 1 and pillar  2. The Basel 
Committee encourages market discipline by the following: Firstly, by developing sets 
of disclosure requirements which will allow market participants to assess key pieces 
of information on the scope of application. Then by; capital risk exposures, risk 
assessment processes, and therefore the capital adequacy of the institution. 
According to the new accord, banks should have a disclosure policy and apply a 
process to assess the appropriateness of the disclosure. For each risk areas banks 
must describe their risk management objectives and policies. Market discipline 
should contribute to a safe and sound banking environment.  
2.4 Critics to Basel II 
Among the most general and large critics about Basel II is that, it is more designed for 
developed countries and it brings competitive disadvantages for the other countries. 
Another point is that the same “bad” loan causes more capital requirement in IRB 
approach than Standard Approach (SA). This may cause those more sophisticated 
banks using the IRB to try to get rid of assets of less quality. On the other hand, there 
will be banks using the SA who will launch loans to these borrowers. Those banks 
have merely no chance to compete with more sophisticated institutions, which will 
have less capital requirement for the same rated asset. Another concern is that 
whether the implementation of the new framework would have any adverse impacts on 
lending to the developing world. With increasing foreign bank entry in the form of 
takeover of domestic banks, the developing countries may experience less access to 
international capital due to stricter and more selective procedures for these domestic 
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banks. 24 Moreover, borrowing costs for the countries that have lower ratings are 
expected to increase.  
In addition to these general critics to the framework, following are the critics specific to 
each of the pillars: 
Critics to Pillar 1 
The first point discussed is that the loss rates determined by the regulators are 
subject to large errors so that gaming is still likely. Furthermore, the models used by 
the banks to generate their internal values are likely to be too complex and opaque 
for supervisors (and even many banks themselves). This makes it difficult to 
understand thoroughly the exact situation of the bank. In addition, the capital 
amounts will be hard to evaluate in terms of its adequacy and compliance with the 
requirements.  
Discussion of Pillar 1 also bypasses a number of important issues concerning the 
definition and measurement of capital. In particular the following questions should be 
considered especially: What is capital; is dividing capital into tiers appropriate and, if 
so, what should be the criteria; role of “subdebt’; what is the relationship between 
capital and loan loss reserves; and how should loss reserves be determined over the 
business cycle. 25 Failure to consider these issues greatly weakens the usefulness of 
the recommendations.  
Another point under discussion is that the use of regulator, rather than market-
determined risk based capital. 
The last controversary point which became more apparent with the recent sub-prime 
mortgage crisis is the ratings by external rating agencies. External ratings constitute 
the basis for the Standardised Approach. The ethical side of rating companies’ 
performance is currently more and more questioned. This is mainly because they are 
assigning ratings for their clients and the separation between commercial and risk 
side of their activity is not clear.  
 
                                               
24
 Griffith-Jones Stephany, Spratt Steven, Segoviano Miguel “The onward march of Basel II: 
Can the interest of developing countries be protected” Institute of Development Studies 
University of Sussex (2002).  
25
 Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee, 2000; Laeven and Majnoni, 2003; and Borio, 
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Critics to Pillar 2 
As stated previously, Pillar 2 indicates that supervisors should take appropriate 
supervisory action if they are not satisfied with the risk management processes of a 
bank. In addition, supervisors should have the ability to require banks to hold capital 
in excess of the minimum. It is argued that it is not highly likely that countries not 
currently granting regulators such powers will introduce them when adopting Basel II. 
It is also discussed that the purpose of the sanctions is not to punish the bank per se, 
but to provide incentives for owners and managers to have higher profitability and a 
stronger capital position.  On the other hand, the framework too much relies on risk 
assessments made by the banks and gives an intensive role to the supervisors. 
Supervisors even express that they need assistance in training of their staff 
especially related to foundations techniques for calculating capital requirements for 
credit and operational risk.  
The other shortcoming is that the supervisory review process cannot discover 
incorrect data used by the banks but rather focuses on the adequacy of the process 
used by the bank.  
Critics to Pillar 3 
It is argued that the requirements for effective market discipline are not discussed in 
the framework. Rather, it focuses on great detail what information on a bank’s 
financial and risk positions need to be disclosed to the public. 26 Disclosure and 
transparency is a necessary but not sufficient condition for effective market 
discipline. Bank stakeholders not at-risk would have little or no incentive to monitor 
their banks and thus have little, if any, use for the information disclosed about the 
financial performance of the banks. While market discipline is likely to encourage 
disclosure, disclosure per se is less likely to encourage market discipline in the 
absence of significant number of at-risk stakeholders. Because of the fear of 
substantial economic harm caused by the failure of large banks, governments and 
bank regulators in almost all countries have tended to avoid failing such institutions. 
They have protected all depositors and other creditors in a de-facto policy termed 
“too-big-to-fail”. 27 In addition, for developing markets with shallow and illiquid stock 
markets, with very limited or no subordinated debt facilities, high or full deposit 
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insurance; talking about market discipline is questionable.  
Even though above mentioned critics, Basel II framework is considered to be an 
important step forward in terms of financial stability of international markets. It both 
increased the sensitivity and knowledge about risk management by bankers, 
regulators, analysts and the public in general. It is able to fill some of the 
shortcomings of Basel I and introduced best practices in the industry and methods of 
risk management.   
2.5 Implementation of Basel II 
The framework projected to be implemented in most G-10 countries as of the 
beginning of 2007, however many EU countries didn’t accomplish this process yet.  
The latest BIS report on Progress on Basel II implementation dated August- 2007 
stated that implementation of the Basel II Framework continues to move forward 
around the globe. A significant number of countries and banks already implemented 
the standardised and foundation approaches as of the beginning of 2007. In many 
other jurisdictions, the necessary infrastructure (legislation, regulation, supervisory 
guidance, etc) to implement the Framework is either in place or in process, which will 
allow a growing number of countries to proceed with implementation of Basel II’s 
advanced approaches in 2008 and 2009. This progress is taking place in both Basel 
Committee member and non-member countries. The Committee’s Accord 
Implementation Group (AIG) and its working groups on validation, operational risk 
and trading book issues continue to actively share supervisory experiences in Basel 
II implementation, thereby promoting consistency across jurisdictions. 
Supervisors also have made strong progress to coordinate home-host 
implementation issues at the level of individual banks, particularly for Pillar 1 
(minimum capital requirements). The Committee’s AIG is now focusing its attention 
on Pillar 2 (supervisory review process) and it will also begin to work on Pillar 3 
(market discipline). Many of the home-host issues that are under review by the AIG 
are not new but have come to the fore as a result of the rapid globalisation of the 
banking sector. As indicated by the report, Basel II has served as a catalyst to 
encourage greater cooperation and communication between jurisdictions and the 
finance industry.  
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2.6 Basel Accord in Turkey 
Basel I started to be implemented in Turkey in 1989 with a 3 years transition period. 
In 1996 market risks are included in capital adequacy calculations to Basel I 
framework. Turkey started to implement this clause as of February 2001, just after 
the severe financial and economic crisis which hit the financial sector very sharply. 
Turkey also participated to the 3rd Quantitative Impact Study (QIS) by the Basel 
Committee in 2003. Afterwards, local QIS studies were realised to estimate the 
possible impacts of a transition to Basel II, which will lead fundamental changes in 
the calculation of capital adequacy of banks. As of June 2007, banks started to 
include operational risk in their capital adequacy ratio calculation.  
Additionally, the calculation of rating based loan risk necessitates the real sector 
companies to prepare financial statements consistent with the international 
accounting and financial reporting standards. However, a new draft Turkish 
Commercial Law which was prepared to this end, was not approved by the 
Parliament. It is also demanded by the representatives of the real sector companies 
that the said rating implementation to be postponed.  
In addition, foreign exchange denominated government securities or receivables 
from the Turkey of banks will be changed in Basel II. In Basel I, 0% risk weight is 
applied –as in all OECD countries. However, it shall be weighted depending on the 
country credit risk. If implemented, this will oblige the banks to allocate more capital 
for asset items, and accordingly it will effect the monetary and finance policies. The 
majority of the banks’ top managements have also requested the postponement of 
the implementation of Basel II. Therefore, rating based loan risk measurement, which 
will be taken as a basis in banks’ capital adequacy calculation, is delayed to the 
beginning of 2009 and rating base accounting shall only be made as an indicator. 28 
The latest QIS Study (QIS-TR2) evaluation report released on July 25th 2007 
indicated the following fundamental findings:29 
• The average capital adequacy ratio of banks participating in the study (31 
banks constituting 97% of the sector) decreased from 19.31% to 13.68%, 
representing a 29.16% drop in ratio. When compared to former QIS studies, 
QIS-TR2 has a lesser impact on capital adequacy ratio and it is well above 
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the legal minimum, of 8%.  
• The main reason for the decrease of the banks’ capital adequacy is not the  
0% risk weight of FX public securities within their portfolios. The relevant is 
that Turkey carries a 100% risk weight because of the country rating grade.  
• Another reason for the decrease in the capital adequacy ratio is the 
operational risk, which is recently included in the calculations.  
• Similarly to the findings of former QIS studies, it is observed that the positive 
impact of the retail portfolio on capital adequacy is continuing. 
• Contrary to the findings of former QIS studies, it is concluded that the SME 
portfolios have a positive effect on capital adequacy rather than a negative 
one. Those portfolios included only the loans and other receivables extended 
to SMEs and the portfolios which include mostly the loans extended to real 
sector companies (SMEs and large enterprises). 
In parallel with the previously presented critics to Basel II in section 2.4, it is expected 
that it will bring some negative consequences for Turkey: Foremost due to the fact 
that Turkey has a low sovereign rating, it will be exposed to higher borrowing costs. 
In addition, it is expected that there will be a decline in emerging market lending and 
therefore more selective lending. 30 31 Finall, overall maturity of lending to Turkish 
banks may decrease and therefore the volatility due to more frequent renewal of 
loans. However, the Basel II Accord will bring the best practices for implementation in 
the sector and therefore improve the solvability and stability of Turkish Banking 
Sector.  
2.6.1 Basel II and Credit Assessment Practices in Turkey 
In terms of credit risk assessment practices in Turkey the following points are 
crucial: Credit rating is a very recent issue in Turkey. Only some internationally 
active, stock exchange companies or financial institutions have credit ratings by 
external rating companies like S&P, Moody’s or Fitch. From the annual reports of 
some commercial banks it can be observed that there are developments concerning 
credit score techniques they applied to their credit portfolios. It is, therefore, 
expected that the majority of the banks will apply Standard Approach, i.e. ratings of 
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external rating institutions recognised by the national supervisory authorities in 
determining the risk weights in capital allocation, when the Basel II Accord is started 
to be implemented.  
The Banking Sector Development Report published by BRSA dated 3rd, July 2007 
and including banking sector data as of the end of 2006 indicates the followings32: 
The banks comprising 50% of the sector started to implement the strategy and 
policies for the Basel II transition at single or consolidated basis. 80% of the sector 
has already founded the related division within the bank and appointed senior 
management, which will be in charge of Basel II processes, whereas 82% of the 
banks already employed the head of the implementation team of this process. As of 
the end of 200672.2% of the banks is largely, 25.9% partially, 1.6% fully compliant 
to their internal roadmaps in Basel II transition, whereas 0.1% is incompliant. 92% of 
the banks are more than 50% compliant with credit risk-standard approach 
requirements, however 73% complied less than 50% of the requirements of IRB 
approach. When the problems about the Basel II transition are considered, it is seen 
that the major constraint for the banks is the shortage of PD data (by 29.3%) and 
LGD and EAD data (27.5%). This is followed by uncertainties in the regulations 
(24.1%) and technological problems (13.1%). It is understood that most of the banks 
didn’t encounter major problems with budget, qualification of the personnel or the 
understanding of Basel II. System and infrastructure of 77.1% of the banks are 
ready to implement the simplified standard approach, 96.5% standard approach, 
23.4% IRB and 13% advanced IRB approach of credit risk. Investments of the 
banks are concentrated on credit risk projects, followed  by those focused on market 
and operational risk.  
According to bank representatives, the most important effects of Basel II transition 
for those banks are plentiful and include issues such as: capital adequacy, data  
preparation, risk measurement analysis, regulations and supervision, rating 
systems, legal reporting, provisions, public announcements, reputation, competition 
structure, reporting systems, profitability, collaterals, limit allocation, portfolio 
preference, pricing, performance measuring, consolidation and funding costs. Less 
important effects were expected in terms of human resources and organisational 
structure. 
                                               
32
 BRSA, The Banking Sector Development Report, 3rd, July 2007. 
  
 - 35 -   
 
Around 50% of the banking sector projects to implement economic capital 
allocation, whereas 44.4% has already started to prepare for that. Only 3% of the 
banks allocated economic capital as of the end of 2006.  
In terms of credit risk mitigation techniques, collaterals and guarantees are used by 
88% of the banks, whereas insurance is utilised by 24%. About 43.4% of the banks 
plan to use hedging and 47.9% of those transfer of the risks. On the other hand, 
46.7% of the banks does not utilise hedging at all, and 42.4% does not implement 
risk transfers.  
As of December 2006, scorecard models are used  by the banks based on rating 
and scoring or judgement. For corporate and SME’s hybrit and parameter 
forecasting models are implemented.  
The six biggest banks, comprising 14% of the sector, stated that they will be able to 
have the necessary knowledge and data systems infrastructure within 1 year to be 
able to implement advanced approaches. One bank mentioned 2 years, nine banks 
3 years, four banks 4 years and seventeen banks 5 years or more. This implies that 
the majority of the banks have the necessary infrastructure to use standard 
approach and they continue to implement their projects for the advanced 
approaches.  
Upto 99% of the banks utilises the credit risk analysis results in decision making 
processes. Results of the study demonstrated that 74.2% of the credit risk analysis 
information is used in specifying medium and long term bank-strategies, 68.4% in 
limit allocations, 56.4% in investment and placement decisions and 43% in 
performance evaluations. With the improvement of risk management practices 
parallel with Basel II implementation, it is forecasted that the financial institutions will 
be able to use rating information in a broader sense.  
As indicated above, insufficiency of historical default data constrains the default 
modelling practices in the banking sector. Recently, banks started to accumulate 
data intensively. 38% of the banks have data with a history of 4-5 years for PD 
calculation. 14.2% have data for LGD with a history of 1 year. The same percentage 
have 5 years’ of EAD data. 53.5% of the banks have a portfolio with rating history 
over the last 4-5 years. 71.6% of the sector started to accumulate rating history data 
in its credit portfolio and 29.5% for EAD.  
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78.7% of the banks use credit risk stress tests. Sensitivity and multivariate scenario        
analysis are utilised by the majority, however historical simulation is not commonly 
used by the sector. 30% of the banks do not apply stress tests. The majority of the 
stress tests and back testing is performed by the sector via information technology 
systems.  
Banks comprising 67.5% of the sector have a strategy and policies to evaluate 
credit concentration and its management. As of end-2006, 27.3% of the banks are in 
the phase of constructing those policies. 79% of the sector have projects to develop 
strategy and policies for the assessment of risk and concerning credit risk mitigation 
techniques. But, only 17% have those strategy and policies already in force. 47% 
have strategy and policies concerning counterparty risk assessment and its 
management, whereas 48% plans to develop them.  
77.4% of the banks are projecting to utilise internal models to calculate their position 
exposed to counterparty risk. Only 19.3% already implement such models. Banks 
use the following methods in order to calculate the value of the over-the-counter 
derivative positions exposed to risk: more than half of them original exposure 
method, 43% current exposure method, 3% other methods such as Delta, Vega, 
Gama values. 
According to public disclosure requirements, half of the sector is compliant with SA, 
only 13% is compliant with IRB in terms of credit risk. In terms of the public 
disclosure of credit risk mitigations, 52% is in line with Basel II and 20% is not.  
Concerning the historical data problems of the banks, another important point is that 
pooled corporate loan data through a national Credit Bureau is not yet available in 
Turkey. Such data would provide input for the low default portfolios of the banks.  
The Credit Bureau in Turkey, named as Kredi Kayıt Bürosu (KKB) A.Ş. was founded 
in 1995 by the major banks. Its aim is to provide the exchange and dissemination of 
information among financial institutions for the purpose of monitoring and controlling 
consumer credit information (including credits cards). KKB created one of the most 
important and the largest databases of Turkey, the Credit Reference System (CRS).  
The CRS is an Information Sharing System through which members can share 
information on personal credit operations.33 According to a presentation given by 
Gürsel Kubilay, the chairman of KKB, in May 2007 in the International Credit Risk 
                                               
33
 www.kkb.com.tr.  
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and Rating Conference organised by Hacettepe University, KKB started to 
implement a project –so called Corporate Bureau Project- concerning corporate 
credit data warehousing. As of October 2004 the system design of the project was 
completed by KKB and as of April 2007 the user tests started. The projected utilities 
through the project are the followings:  
• Credit decisions of the financial institutions will be based on updated, 
healthy, extensive and objective information.    
• Transparency will increase and credit repayment discipline will be provided.  
• Financial institutions will have the possibility to increase their credit volume 
by keeping the operational costs under control.  
• An updated and healthy database service will be provided for Basel II 
implementation and rating model construction. 
• The member institutions and the regulatory authorities will be supported 
through the statistical reports, which will be produced for different sectors in 
various fractions.  
The corporate database of KKB is composed of 1,238,222 companies, which are 
40,139 corporations, 256,942 limited companies, 905,833 sole proprietorships and 
35,308 other company types. 34   
All financial institutions are projected by KKB to be included to this system of data 
sharing. Through the implementation of Corporate Bureau Project, it can be 
estimated that the financial sector will benefit from the pooled data in its credit risk 
modeling practices.  
In conclusion, while preparing for the implementation of Basel II, the Turkish 
banking sector has also been reviewing and adjusting its risk assessment 
processes. Turkish Banks are still in the initial phases of implementation, but on the 
other hand consider it as a highly important subject. Significant progress has 
already been made in terms of system and infrastructure. It should be 
acknowledged that credit rating is a very recent issue in Turkey. Still, only some 
internationally active, stock exchange listed companies and/or financial institutions 
have external credit ratings from the major rating companies. On the other hand, 
                                               
34
 Presentation given by Gürsel Kubilay, the chairman of KKB, the International Credit Risk 
and Rating Conference, organised by Hacettepe University, May 2007. 
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almost all Turkish banks utilise credit analysis results in decision making processes. 
Most banks also use it in specifying medium and long terms strategies, but only to a 
lesser extent in limit allocations, investment and placement decisions as well as 
performance evaluations.  
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CHAPTER 3 
VARIABLE SELECTION AND PREDICTION 
TECHNIQUES  
In this study corporate credit decisions -whether to grant or reject a credit- are 
modelled through an empirical research. Therefore, this chapter focuses on the 
models most widely used.  For this purpose, binary choice models -namely probit 
and logit models- are among the most widely applied techniques in credit decision 
modelling. In these models, the dependent variable- whether or not the loan is 
granted- is binary. For this reason, the regression function can be interpreted as a 
predicted probability. Such a probability has a non-linear nature and therefore a 
linear probability model does not provide an optimum probabilistic result. Probit and 
logit regressions do model this nonlinearity in the probabilities and are, therefore, the 
preferred methods. Hence; probit and logit regressions are used in our empirical 
research, which is the subject of the next chapter, Chapter 4.  
3.1 Binary Choice Models 
In a binary choice model, the dependent variable takes only two possible values.  In 
credit scoring the dependent variable is identified as follows: 
  1, 
  0, 
i i
i i
y y
y
y y
=
= 
=
i.e., the firm defaults
i.e., the firm non - defaults
if
if
              (3.1) 
There are discrete or continuous independent variables; the model is: 
[ ] { } { } ( )/ 1/ 0 /E Y X P Y X P X X F Xβ ε β pi= = = + > = =            (3.2) 
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Here F is the cumulative distribution function (inverse link function), β is an unknown 
parameter vector of the model, and pi is the probability that the dependent variable 
takes the value 1.  
In binary response models, since the dependent variable takes only two possible 
values with probability pi, it can be assumed that the distribution of the dependent 
variable has a Bernoulli probability distribution.  
The Bernoulli probability function is:  
( ) ( ) ( )
[ ]
[ ] ( )
1/ 1 0,1
var 1
yyf y y
E y
y
pi pi pi
pi
pi pi
−
= − =
=
= −
                                                          (3.3) 
3.1.1 Maximum likelihood estimation  
The logit and probit coefficients, in these models, are estimated using the method of 
maximum  likelihood. This produces efficient (minimum variance) estimators in a 
wide variety of applications, including regression with a binary dependent variable. 
The maximum likelihood estimator is consistent and normally distributed in large 
samples, so that t-statistics and confidence intervals for the coefficients can be 
constructed.  
Regression software for estimating probit and logit models typically uses maximum 
likelihood estimation (MLE), and it is common to apply MLE in practice.  
The likelihood function through the observed data is defined by  
(3.4):  
( ) ( )( )1
1
: ( ) 1 ii
n yy
i i i
i
L x x xpi pi
−
=
= −∏                                                                            (3.4) 
where  
pi(xi) is the probability that each observation with xi independent variable vector takes 
the value 1 as dependent variable.  
Generally log-likelihood functions are utilised when MLE is used. This is because it is 
easier to maximize the natural logarithm of the likelihood function and monotonic 
transformation does not make any change in the results when calculating the 
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optimum points. The log-likelihood for binary data is defined by (3.5).         
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ){ }
1
ln 1 ln 1
n
i i i i i i i
i
l x y p x y p x
=
= + − −∑                                                  (3.5) 
The estimate of unknown parameter β^ is obtained by solving (3.6). 
ln 0L ββ
∂
∂
( )
=                                                                                                   (3.6) 
3.1.2 Goodness of fit measures 
Deviance 
In regression models for binary dependent variables, the comparison of the predicted 
and observed models is dependent on the log-likelihood function. The model is called 
saturated if all independent variables are used in the model. Deviance is a measure 
of deviation of the model from realized values.  
Let logL1 denote the maximum likelihood value of the model of interest (or current 
model), and let logL0 denote the maximum value of the loglikelihood function when 
all parameters, except the intercept, are set to zero.  
The deviance measure is defined as: 
1
0
log
log
Ly
L
= -2ln( )                                                                                           (3.7) 
When models are compared, the deviance is used as a measure to determine which 
one to choose as a selection criteria. The model with lower deviance will be chosen.  
Pearson Chi-Square Goodness of Fit Statistic 
Pearson Chi-Square is a simple non-parametric goodness of fit test which measures 
how well an assumed model predicts the observed data. This statistic proposed by 
Hosmer and Lemeshow (1980).  
The test statistic is: 
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1
)n
i
observedfrequency fitted frequency
fitted frequency
=
−
∑
(X² =  ²
 
                                             (3.8) 
χ2  is assumed to be chi-square with n − p degrees of freedom.  
Unfortunately, like other proposed fit statistics, the Hosmer-Lemeshow statistic does 
not have good power for detecting particular types of lack of fit (Hosmer et al. 1977). 
In any case, a large value of a global fit statistic merely indicates some lack of fit but 
provides no insight about its nature. The approach of comparing the working model 
to a more complex one is more useful, since it searches for lack of fit of a particular 
type.  
Likelihood Ratio (LR) Statistic  
The LR statistic is a goodness of fit test, which depends on a log-likelihood function. 
The purpose of this test is to compare the models with and without independent 
variables. The test statistic is:  
( )0 12 log logLR L L= − −                                   (3.9)                                                       
To test the null hypothesis that all the slope coefficients are simultaneously equal to 
zero, the equivalent of the F test in the linear regression model is the likelihood ratio 
(LR) statistic. Given the null hypothesis, the LR statistic follows the X2 distribution 
with degrees of freedom equal to the number of explanatory variables . 
Pseudo R2  
Pseudo R2 is the measure of fit using the likelihood function, similar to the R2 in a 
linear regression. Pseudo R2 measures the explained percentage of dependent 
variables. It can also be called the determination coefficient.  Because the MLE 
maximizes the likelihood function, adding another regressor to a probit or logit model 
increases the value of the maximized likelihood, just like adding a regressor 
necessarily reduces the sum of squared residuals in linear regression by Ordinary 
Least Squares method. This suggests that measuring the quality of fit of a probit 
model is possible by comparing values of the maximized likelihood function with all 
regressors to the value of the likelihood .  
The formula for this statistic is given by 3.10:  
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1 0
1
1 2(log log ) /pseudoR L L N+ −² =1-                                                          (3.10)                                                                                      
Where N denotes the number of observations. Pseudo R2 ranges between 0 and 1.  
When comparing the models, the model with higher pseudo R2 will be preferred as it 
is the determination coefficient.  
McFadden’s R2 
It is an alternative measure of fitness suggested by McFadden (1974) and 
sometimes referred to as the likelihood ratio index. It is given by the below formula: 
2
1 01 log / logMcFaddenR L L= −                                                                          (3.11) 
Because the loglikelihood is the sum of log probabilities, it follows that log L0 ≤ log L1 
< 0, from which both measures take on values in the interval [0,1] only. If all 
estimated slope coefficients are equal to zero we have log L0= log L1, such that both 
R2’s are equal to zero. Consequently, the upper limit for this measure is obtained for 
log L1=0. The upper bound of 1 can be, in theory, attained by McFadden’s measure.  
3.1.3 Binary logistic regression  
Logistic regression is applied when the dependent variable is binary or dichotomous 
and the independent variables are of any type. Among the first users of logit analysis 
in the context of financial distress was Ohlson (1980). Logistic regression has 
advantages because the scores are interpretable in terms of log odds. Therefore, 
constructed probabilities can be meaningful. Logistic regression is modelled directly 
as a function, rather than as ratio of two densities. It is a proven method to utilise 
when combined with feature creation and selection. The disadvantage is that it can 
over- or under interpret some parameters. 35 
In logistic regression as in the other binary choice models, the dependent variable 
can take only two possible values and the distribution is assumed to be Bernoulli.  
The link function of the logit model is: 
( )( ) ( )( )ln 1
x
x x
x
piη pi β
pi
= =
−
             (3.12) 
                                               
35
 Monsour C., Discrete predictive modelling, Casualty Actuarial Society, Special interest 
seminar on predictive modelling, Chicago (2004) 
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The link function in logistic regression is called logit. To predict the unknown 
parameters the cumulative logistic distribution function is defined as: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
11
1 exp
F x x x x
X
η piβ= − = Λ = =− −                                             (3.13)                          
The score vector for logistic regression is: 

1
ln ( - ( ))i i
n
i
i
L
x y xββ
=
∂ Λ
∂ ∑
( )
=                   (3.14)                                                                      
By using iterative optimization methods the unknown parameters can be estimated. 
By Wald test and goodness of fit tests, the significance of the model can be checked. 
The significant logistic regression model can be applied to predict future values of 
observations.  
Like discriminant analysis, this technique weights the independent variables and 
assigns a Z score in a form of failure probability to each company in a sample. The 
advantage of this method is that it does not assume multivariate normality and equal 
covariance matrices as discriminant analysis does. Logit analysis incorporates non-
linear effects, and uses the logistical cumulative function in predicting a bankruptcy. 
Unlike linear regression there are no assumptions about the linearity between 
independent and dependent variables and the normality of independent variables 
before analysing.  
3.1.4 Variable Selection in Logistic Regression  
Variable selection process is essential because of the following: The main aim of 
statistical models is to build a parsimonious model that explains the variability in 
dependent variable. When a model has a lesser number of independent variables, it 
can be interpreted easier. In addition, the model with multivariate independent 
variables may give more accurate results within sample observations. On the other 
hand, when too many variables are employed in a model, it can result in an 
overparametrisation problem.  
Regarding the variable selection process, first, the significance of each coefficient is 
checked in variable selection process.  In binary choice models, Wald statistic can be 
employed for testing the significance. If the significance p<0.10 for any coefficient of 
the variable with 90% confidence level, it can be concluded that the contribution of 
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the variable to the model is important. Wald statistic has a drawback: if the number of 
observations is inadequate, the model could be unstable and therefore the Wald 
statistic would be inappropriate.  
After the significance is determined, the insignificant variables are eliminated and 
models without these variables are compared to the model including those by using 
G likelihood ratio test. The significance of variables in the new model should also be 
checked because of the change in the estimated values of coefficients.  
Further to the selection of significant variables; if the model includes too many 
variables, stepwise variable selection method can be used as a variable selection 
tool.  
Stepwise Selection Method  
The stepwise selection method is a variable selection tool that is employed to include 
or exclude a significant variable to the model through the use of decision rules. It is 
also utilised in linear regression model.  
(a)  Forwardation  
Forward variable selection starts with including only the constant term to the model. 
In addition, the log-likelihood value of the model is evaluated followed by estimation 
of log-likelihoods of models for each variable. Finally, by using  these estimates, the 
value of likelihood ratio tests is found:  
( ) ( ) ( )0 0 02 1,...j jG L L j p= − =              (3.15) 
where  
Gj(0) is the likelihood ratio test and Lj0 is the log-likelihood of the model with jth  
independent variable in step 0.  
The significance value of G likelihood test is found as:  
( )( )021Pr jX G>               (3.16) 
The most important variable, the variable with smallest significance level, is selected 
and is included in the model. If the significance level is smaller than α, the process 
stops.  
If the process continues to the next step, the model in step 0 is taken as the 
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reference model and a second “important variable” is selected. The likelihood ratio is 
estimated for the model with the most important variable versus the model with both 
the most important variable (of the first model) and the second most important 
variable. In this step, the significance value is estimated for p − 1 variables and the 
variable with minimum significance is included into the model. Then, the significance 
level is compared to the α; if it is smaller than α, it stops. This process continues until 
all variables that are important by means of alpha criteria are included to the model.  
The meaning of α significance value, in this respect, is that it determines the number 
of independent variables. It is generally recommended to take α between 0.15 and 
0.20. 
(b) Backwardation  
Backwardation starts with including all variables in the model. In the  
first step, G is estimated for the models with all variables and the variable considered 
to be deleted. In addition, the significance value is estimated as in the forwardation 
method. The variable with the maximum  significance is deleted. This process 
continues until all variables with significance estimate above α are deleted from the 
model.  
3.1.5 Binary probit regression 
As with binary logistic regression, in binary probit regression the dependent variable 
can only take two possible values with Bernoulli distribution. Probit regression is a 
tool for a dichotomous dependent variable. The term “probit” was first used in the 
1930’s by Chester Bliss and implies a probability unit. It has the advantages of being 
easily computable and providing probabilistic results. The disadvantage is that over- 
and underestimation problems can occur.  
The link function for probit regression is,  
( )( ) ( )( )x x xη pi pi β= =-1Ф              (3.17) 
where Φ−1 (.) is the inverse standard normal distribution function.  
The link function in probit regression is called probit or normit. The cumulative probit 
function is needed to estimate the unknown parameters. It is identified as:  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1F x x x xη pi−= = =Ф              (3.18) 
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Here Φ(.) is the standard normal distribution function. 
The score vector for probit is defined as follows: 

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Ф Ф
                                                          (3.19) 
After the significant probit model is formulated, it can also be used for predicting the 
values of dependent variable.  
In both probit and logit regressions the effect of a change in a regressor can be 
computed in two ways: Firstly, by computing the predicted probability for the initial 
value of regressors. Secondly, by computing the predicted probability for the new or 
changed value of the regressors, and taking their difference. 
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CHAPTER 4 
APPLICATION AND RESULTS 
In this chapter, the credit assessment process of a financial institution is presented. A 
specific large Turkish financial institution provided the credit decision data for the 
empirical research. Since the rating companies’ ratings will be the basis for  Basel II-
Standard Approach and similar models as those of the rating companies are being 
or will be constructed internally by the financial institutions within the Basel II 
transition process. With the Basel II implementation, it is forecasted that those 
parameters already used by the rating companies will be utilised by financial 
institutions in their rating and credit decision models. The chapter discusses the 
model used for the empirical research and the parameters estimated by it. The 
results are compared with the variables of the Moody’s’ private company rating 
model. In addition, by the quantitative information provided by the institution  
through an interview, properties of the rating system of the financial institution are 
analysed. Finally, conclusions and comparisons are drawn regarding the predictive 
performance of logit and probit regression models. 
4.1 Main considerations of the analysed financial institution 
in assigning grades 
Based on the qualitative information obtained from the financial institution through an 
interview, the followings are concluded regarding their internal procedures in terms of 
assigning grades to clients: 
The considered financial institution uses last three years` balance sheets, income  
and cash flow statements of the borrower in its credit approval process. Out of these 
historical and trend data some financial ratios are calculated by the institution.  
The financial institution, then, assigns an internal rating to each of its corporate 
clients which are already existing or new in its credit assessment process. External 
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ratings are not used.  
Figure (4.1) represents the credit assessment and rating system targeted by the 
studied institution in parallel with Basel II- IRB Approach, though not yet 
implemented . Because of limited default data available to the institution, PD values 
are not assigned to each rating category.  
The criteria within the rating system of the financial institution are divided into two: 
qualitative and quantitative. Quantitative factors are defined as those which are in 
the form of ratios or financial figures, obtained or calculated from the financial 
statements of the company. Whereas, qualitative factors are those which are 
complementary to the financial statements of the company. Though most of the 
qualitative factors used are quantifiable, i.e. can be expressed into numbers, some 
others are judgemental. The institution attempts to base its process to the extent 
possible on quantifiable information. It can be concluded that it has a process similar 
to an expert judgement based process, since the institution allows the credit analyst 
to adjust the final grade.  
Figure 4.1 Rating System Targeted by the Analysed Financial Institution 
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Time horizon, the expected time interval in which the assigned rating is considered 
to be valid, is defined as one year. This definition is based on annual financial 
reporting cycles of the borrower and the institution, frequency of internal review of 
the rating and uncertainties of projected performance beyond one year –mainly due 
to cyclicality of the Turkish Economy.    
The rating system indicated to be “point-in-time” oriented and therefore the internal 
rating reflects the assessment of the borrower’s condition as of the date of the 
financial statement and its expected performance within one year, rather than 
“bottom of the cycle scenario”, i.e. its condition under stress. To be able to prove 
this statistically, one should observe time series default data of the institution. Due 
to inability to obtain this information, such an analysis could not be made. 
Regardless of whether the financial institution assessing rating to borrowers, 
facilities or both, it assign these ratings based on assessment of the counterparty. 
The credit risk mitigation techniques are not yet incorporated into the rating process. 
The institution utilises the rating information for management reporting and limit 
setting; but not for pricing, compensation and risk adjusted performance 
measurement purposes.  
Table 4.1 Main Sections of the Financial Institution’s Internal Rating 
System  
Internal Rating System Main 
Sections 
        
QUALITATIVE SECTION   
-Operating environment  
-Company   
-Management  
-Semi-financials 
 
 
    
QUANTITATIVE SECTION   
-Cash flow and liquidity  
-Earnings and profitability  
-Capital structure  
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4.2 Data 
In this chapter the properties of the data used in the modelling process are 
analysed. The data was obtained from a financial institution in Turkey, which was 
used by the institution in its credit assessment and rating processes. It includes all 
the corporate credit applications, numbered to 532, to the financial institution over 
the year 2006. 453 of those credit applications were accepted by the institution, 
whereas 79 of them were rejected. There are 17 independent variables: 2 of them 
concerns firm-specific characteristics, 7 financial variables or ratios, 8 binary 
variables about the sector of activity in which the company operates. Table 4.3 
presents the breakdown of data in terms of sectors and Table 4.4 demonstrates the 
sectoral breakdown of rejected companies. The response variable has two 
categories: 0 means that the credit application of a company is accepted; whereas 1 
stands for a rejected credit application.  
4.2.1 Variables 
The variables used in our modelling process and their corresponding meanings are 
as follows. Table 4.4 also summarises those variables. 
1. AGE:  
The number of years the company is operational. 
2. EMPLOYEE:  
The number of employees of the company. 
3. TO:  
Turnover or net sales revenue of the company over the last analysed year 
represented in Turkish Lira (TRY). 
Turnover indicates the size of the business of the company. Smaller size implies 
less diversification and less depth in management, which leads to greater 
susceptibility to idiosyncratic shocks. Size is also related to “market position”, a 
common qualitative term used in underwriting.  36 
 
 
                                               
36
 Moody’s Rating Methodology-RiskCalcTM for Private companies Moody’s Default Model, 
May 2000, p. 35 
  
 - 52 -   
 
4. NETWORTH:  
Net worth or total shareholders’ equity of the company  over the last analysed year 
represented in TRY. Net worth is also a size factor like turnover.  
5. CURRENTR:  
Current ratio (current assets / current liabilities) is calculated from the latest balance 
sheet of the company. It is an indicator of a firms’ ability to meet its short term debt 
obligations. If the current ratio of a company is more than 2, the firm’s liquidity level 
is considered to be satisfactory and therefore, the firm would be expected to meet 
its short-term obligations without any difficulty. However, in a developing country like 
Turkey this ratio is in general lower than for the companies operating in developed 
countries. Therefore, a current ratio of 1.5 or higher is considered to be  acceptable 
by the financial institutions. If the current ratio of a firm is less than 1, one can 
expect that the company will have problems to fulfil its short-term debt obligations. 
Liquidity is also an obvious contemporaneous measure of default, since if a firm is in 
default, its current ratio must be low. 37 
6. SOLVENCYR: 
Solvency or debt ratio: (current debts + long term debts) / total assets 
Debt ratio is a key measure to firm riskiness and it indicates the percentage of 
assets that have been financed by borrowing. From a creditors’ perspective; the 
lower the ratio is, the less risky is the firm. It is because high indebtedness can 
create debt pressure on the company and firms’ debt may involve interest rate 
payments. How much the company finances its current operations or investments 
by debt or by equity is important to be considered by a financial institution. The 
repayment schedule of the debts of a company is also important to be analysed at 
this point. The higher the debt ratio, the smaller the cushion for adverse shocks.  
7. PROFITMARG: 
Net profit margin (net profit / net sales) of the company over the last analysed 
period.  
The profit margin tells how much profit a company makes for every 1 TRY it 
generates in revenue. Profit margins vary by industry, but all else being equal, the 
                                               
37
 Moody’s Rating Methodology-RiskCalcTM for Private companies Moody’s Default Model, May 
2000, p. 36 
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higher a company’s profit margin compared to its competitors, the better. Profit 
margin is an indicator of effectiveness of the firm in controlling its costs and the 
extent to which the firm concludes its operations over a given period in profit.  
8. SHRETURN: 
Shareholders’ return or return on equity (ROE) ratio (net profit/shareholders’ equity). 
ROE indicates the profit generated out of the capital invested by the shareholders’ 
of the company. The higher the ratio is, the better is the profit generating capability 
of the company.  
Higher profitability should raise a firm’s equity value. It also implies a longer way for 
revenues to fall or costs to rise before losses occur.38 
9. TOTALASSETS: 
Total assets refers to the sum of current and long-term assets owned by the firm 
represented in TRY. As turnover, it is a reflection of size risk.  
10. AUTOMTV: 
Concerns an industry dummy variable and it takes the value “1” if the company is 
involved in automotive sector and else it takes the value 0.  
As the probability of bankruptcy is likely to vary across industry sectors, it is 
important to include in the model the industry dummies. 39 
11. CHEM: 
An industry dummy variable and it takes the value “1” if the company is involved in 
chemistry sector and else it takes the value 0.  
12. CONSTR: 
An industry dummy variable and it takes the value “1” if the company is involved in 
construction sector and else it takes the value 0.  
13. ELECTRCL: 
An industry dummy variable and it takes the value “1” if the company is involved in 
electrical and electronical appliances sector and else it takes the value 0.  
                                               
38
 Moody’s Rating Methodology-RiskCalcTM for Private companies Moody’s Default Model, 
May 2000, p. 32 
39
 Clive Lennox (1999), Identifying Failing Companies: A Reevaluation of the Logit, Probit 
and DA Approaches, p. 351.  
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14. MACHNRY: 
An industry dummy variable and it takes the value “1” if the company is involved in 
electrical and machinery sector and else it takes the value 0.  
15. METAL: 
An industry dummy variable and it takes the value “1” if the company is involved in 
metal sector and else it takes the value 0.  
16. SERVICE: 
An industry dummy variable and it takes the value “1” if the company is involved in 
service sector and else it takes the value 0.  
17. TEXTILE: 
An industry dummy variable and it takes the value “1” if the company is involved in 
textile sector and else it takes the value 0.  
TABLE 4.2 Variable Description 
Variable Name Description 
Firm characteristics:   
AGE 
Number of years since the company became 
operational 
EMPLOYEE 
Number of employees as of the credit assessment 
period 
Financial characteristics: 
TO Turnover (Net sales of the company) (in TRY) 
NETWORTH Total shareholders' equity (in TRY) 
CURRENTR Current ratio [(current assets)/(current liabilities)] 
SOLVENCYR Solvency ratio [(total debt)/(shareholders' equity)] 
PROFITMARG Net profit margin [(net profit)/(net sales)] 
SHRETURN Shareholders' return [(net profit)/(shareholders' equity)] 
TOTALASSETS Total firm assets (in TRY) 
Sector characteristics:   
AUTOMTV =1 if in automotive industry 
CHEM =1 if in chemicals industry 
CONSTR =1 if in construction industry 
ELECTRCL =1 if in electrical appliances industry 
MACHNRY =1 if in machinery industry 
METAL =1 if in metal industry 
SERVICE =1 if in services sector 
TEXTILE =1 if in textile industry 
Credit granting decision (Dependent Variable) 
ACCEPTREJ =1 if credit is rejected 
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TABLE 4.3 Breakdown of Companies’ Data in terms of Industries 
  Industry Sector 
Number of 
Companies   %  
1 Automotive 25   4.70%  
2 Chemicals  213  40.04%  
3 Construction 36  6.77%  
4 Electrical Appliances 41  7.71%  
5 Machinery 10  1.88%  
6 Metal 56  10.53%  
7 Service 62  11.65%  
8 Textile  89   16.73%  
  Total 532   100.00%  
TABLE 4.4 Breakdown of Rejected Companies’ Data in terms of Industries 
  Industry Sector 
Number of 
Companies   %   
1 Automotive 2   2.53%   
2 Chemicals  30  37.97%   
3 Construction 3  3.80%   
4 Electrical Appliances 6  7.59%   
5 Machinery 1  1.27%   
6 Metal 2  2.53%   
7 Service 9  11.39%   
8 Textile  26   32.91%   
  Total 79   100.00%   
4.3 Data Diagnostic 
Diagnostic of the data is important part of the modelling process. The pre-analysis of 
the data by making use of descriptive statistics is necessary since it can give some 
hints about the data. Finding out whether the data complies with the assumptions of 
the model used or not is important in this process.  
The descriptive statistics of the data are presented and analysed in Table 4.5 and 
the Appendix. The following data anomalies have been noted: Four companies’ 
credit applications have been accepted, even though they had negative 
shareholders’ equity and therefore are technically bankrupt. According to the 
interview with the institution, the followings are mentioned as possible reasons: The 
company belongs to a strong group which is expected to support the company in 
case of insolvency. Another reason can be that the institution wants to closely follow 
up its credit receivables from the company resulting from previous lending. This can 
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be due to delinquency or negative developments in the company’s financial 
situation. Especially when the company is dependent on lending by the institution, 
the institution cannot immediately cut its lending, to be able to collect its credit 
receivables. Another anomaly observed in the data is too high current ratio values 
for five companies, mainly operating in construction sector. The possible reason 
indicated by the institution is that those companies are operating in project basis 
lasting more than one accounting period and their financials are presented in 
percentage of completion basis. Therefore, revenues earned are recorded as assets 
until the project is completed. This may create some anomalies in their financial 
statement values and ratios. 
Among those descriptive statistics “mean” or “average” is the central location or 
arithmetic average of the data. “Average” considered on its own, may not give 
meaningful information. It becomes more meaningful when it is analysed together 
with the “standard deviation”, which measures the variability or distance from the 
mean of the data. A low variance indicates that, it demonstrates that mean is more 
representative for the sample. In our sample, it can be seen that turnover, net worth, 
number of employees, current ratio, solvency ratio and total assets are highly 
variable compared to other variables. Therefore; for those, mean is less 
representative in comparison with the rest of the parameters.   
In addition to the mean and the standard deviation there are minimum, maximum, 
first quartile, second quartile, third quartile values in the data. Minimum and 
maximum ara the minimum and maximum values observed in a data sample. First 
quartile or lower quartile cuts off lowest 25% of the data (25th percentile). Second 
quartile, median or 50th percentile cuts data set in half. Similarly, third quartile or 
upper quartile cuts off lowest 75% of the data (75th percentile).  In our data by 
checking these statistics, it is observed that the parameters are highly variable.  
When the distribution of the data is analysed, firstly it is tested whether the data are 
normally distributed or not by using skewness and kurtosis. Kurtosis is the degree of 
peakedness of a distribution. It is a measure of the extent to which observed data 
fall near the centre of a distribution or in the tails. Standard normal distribution has a 
kurtosis of zero. Positive kurtosis indicates a “peaked” distribution and negative 
kurtosis indicates a “flat” distribution. Skewness defines the degree of asymmetry of 
a distribution. A negative skewness value indicates that the data have a distribution 
skewed left. A positive skewness value implies a right skewed distribution. A zero 
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skewness value indicates that the data has a symmetric distribution. A normal 
distribution is charactherised by a skewness value of zero and a kurtosis of three. If 
kurtosis of a distribution is above three, then it has fat tails which indicates a non-
normal distribution.  
The skewness and kurtosis statistics are indicated in the Appendix. According to the 
Figures 1-9; age, current ratio, number of employees, net worth, turnover and total 
assets variables are right skewed; whereas profit margin, shareholders’ return and 
solvency are left skewed. On the other hand, when the kurtosis value is analysed, it 
can be seen on the table that all the variables have kurtosis value above three, and 
therefore have fat-tails.  
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TABLE 4.5 Descriptive statistics for the data 
     
Spell Unit N µ σ min Q1 Q2 Q3 max 
Accepted 
 453        
AGE years  17.09 11.33 1.00 9.00 15.00 23.00 61.00 
EMPLOYEE number  382.50 935.85 2.00 8,000.00 35.00 80.00 257.00 
TO TRY  442,495,313 1,453,124,250 175,000 17,126,000 73,000,000 268,000,000 20,103,000,000 
NETWORTH TRY  180,688,575 529,529,291 -35,038,000 4,776,500 30,000,000 123,734,000 5,557,000,000 
CURRENTR ratio  20.50 194.93 0.00 1.20 1.57 3.00 4,000.00 
SOLVENCYR percentage 201.28 444.93 -3,286.00 41.22 103.46 240.94 4,476.95 
PROFITMARG percentage 7.13 23.89 -258.08 0.68 2.90 8.00 170.00 
SHRETURN percentage 13.73 28.80 -142.94 2.00 9.65 20.00 282.90 
TOTALASSETS TRY  319,558,724 1,001,587,499 -9,734,819 9,275,000 48,785,000 187,401,000 8,665,000,000 
AUTOMTV binary  0.05 0.22 0 0 0 0 1 
CHEM binary  0.40 0.49 0 0 0 1 1 
CONSTR binary  0.07 0.26 0 0 0 0 1 
ELECTRCL binary  0.08 0.27 0 0 0 0 1 
MACHNRY binary  0.02 0.14 0 0 0 0 1 
METAL binary  0.12 0.32 0 0 0 0 1 
SERVICE binary  0.12 0.32 0 0 0 0 1 
TEXTILE binary  0.14 0.35 0 0 0 0 1 
Rejected  79        
AGE years  17.87 11.45 2.00 10.50 15.00 25.00 60.00 
EMPLOYEE number  158.03 295.97 3.00 25.00 52.00 154.00 2,013.00 
TO TRY  68,144,975 155,359,230 170,000 6,736,500 25,000,000 56,082,500 925,295,000 
NETWORTH TRY  14,033,988 51,879,190 
-
243,000,000 111,000 4,501,000 18,251,423 291,170,000 
CURRENTR ratio  9.71 59.40 0.00 0.60 0.86 1.22 500.00 
SOLVENCYR percentage 27.60 1,494.91 -8,746.64 12.50 96.55 303.55 4,051.77 
PROFITMARG percentage -33.85 107.06 -800.00 -30.00 -9.82 0.14 107.06 
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Spell Unit N µ σ min Q1 Q2 Q3 max 
SHRETURN percentage -60.56 292.66 -2,455.65 -37.96 -15.00 -0.10 334.53 
TOTALASSETS TRY  77,877,283 149,893,942 -76,221,160 4,153,500 24,427,000 78,106,000 904,537,000 
AUTOMTV binary  0.03 0.16 0 0 0 0 1 
CHEM binary  0.38 0.49 0 0 0 1 1 
CONSTR binary  0.04 0.19 0 0 0 0 1 
ELECTRCL binary  0.08 0.27 0 0 0 0 1 
MACHNRY binary  0.01 0.11 0 0 0 0 1 
METAL binary  0.03 0.16 0 0 0 0 1 
SERVICE binary  0.11 0.32 0 0 0 0 1 
TEXTILE binary  0.33 0.47 0 0 0 1 1 
Overall  532        
AGE years  17.21 11.34 1.00 9.00 15.00 23.00 61.00 
EMPLOYEE number  349.16 874.51 2.00 31.75 77.50 250.00 8,000.00 
TO TRY  386,905,695 1,348,598,527 170,000 13,294,750 56,937,000 221,550,000 20,103,000,000 
NETWORTH TRY  155,894,390 492,468,942 -243,000,000 3,169,500 21,079,000 98,553,500 5,557,000,000 
CURRENTR ratio  18.90 181.32 0.00 1.05 1.50 2.52 4,000.00 
SOLVENCYR percentage 175.49 707.53 -8,746.64 40.00 101.73 250.00 4,476.95 
PROFITMARG percentage 1.05 48.81 -800.00 0.01 2.01 7.00 170.00 
SHRETURN percentage 2.70 118.27 -2,455.65 0.09 6.88 18.65 334.53 
TOTALASSETS TRY  283,669,938 929,854,212 -76,221,160 8,692,750 43,809,000 163,303,500 8,665,000,000 
AUTOMTV binary  0.05 0.21 0 0 0 0 1 
CHEM binary  0.40 0.49 0 0 0 1 1 
CONSTR binary  0.07 0.25 0 0 0 0 1 
ELECTRCL binary  0.08 0.27 0 0 0 0 1 
MACHNRY binary  0.02 0.14 0 0 0 0 1 
METAL binary  0.11 0.31 0 0 0 0 1 
SERVICE binary  0.12 0.32 0 0 0 0 1 
TEXTILE binary   0.17 0.37 0 0 0 0 1 
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4.4 Logistic Regression Results 
In this study, the logit and probit model coefficients are estimated using the method 
of maximum likelihood. In both models, initially, 17 variables are analysed each in a 
univariate model. Those variables were firm-specific factors, e.g. age and number of 
employees, financial variables including ratios and size figures and the industry in 
which the company operates as binary variable. Those variables in both logit and 
probit models are selected through a forward selection algorithm, i.e. a process 
which includes the variables one by one to the model by taking into account their 
predictive power.    
Univariate logit regression results are summarised in Table 4.6.  
TABLE 4.6 Univariate Logit Regression Results 
Variable Constant Coefficient p-value 
AGE -1.850 0.006 0.562 
EMPLOYEE -1.563 -8.08E-04 0.049 
TO -1.311 -3.57E-09 0.035 
NETWORTH -1.191 -1.48E-09 0.001 
CURRENTR -1.735 -9.12E-04 0.678 
SOLVENCYR -1.711 -2.67E-04 0.088 
PROFITMARG -1.888 -0.061 0.015 
SHRETURN -1.762 -0.023 0.009 
TOTALASSETS -1.526 -1.73E-09 0.027 
AUTOMTV -1.720 -0.722 0.333 
CHEM -1.707 -0.101 0.685 
CONSTR -1.710 -0.688 0.263 
ELECTRCL -1.745 -0.018 0.967 
MACHNRY -1.739 -0.458 0.666 
METAL -1.645 -1.650 0.023 
SERVICE -1.743 -0.030 0.937 
TEXTILE -1.996 1.110 0.000 
The coefficients of the model are shown in Table 4.7: 
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TABLE 4.7 Logit Regression Model Parameters 
Variable Coefficient 
Std. 
Errors 
P-
values 
constant -1.549 0.204 0.000 
TO -2.63E-09 1.44E-09 0.067 
NETWORTH -1.45E-08 7.15E-09 0.042 
PROFITMARG -0.047 0.026 0.076 
TOTALASSETS 3.39E-09 1.73E-09 0.049 
TEXTILE 0.742 0.317 0.019 
 
The regression equation of our model was found as: 
 
1.549 2.63 09* 1.45 08*
0.047* 3.39 09 0.742*
Z E TO E NETWORTH
PROFITMARG E TOTALASSETS TEXTILE
= − − − − −
− + − − +
 
Though the dependent variable takes binary values 0 and 1, the regression equation 
does not provide prediction values of 0 and 1. The regression equation in the form of 
linear combinations of independent variables gives the log-odds and those log- odds 
are used to calculate the predicted values of probabilities of default. The parameter 
coefficients are named as logits of explanatory variables utilised to estimate log-
odds. One unit of increase or decrease in a variable with β1 logit is associated with 
a β1 change in log odds of the dependent variable. It does not directly effect the 
change in the dependent variable.  
The output of logistic regression from Eviews are shown in the Table 4.8.  
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TABLE 4.8 Logit regression statistics 
Dependent Variable: ACCEPTREJ  
Method: ML - Binary Logit (Quadratic hill climbing) 
Date: 12/10/07   Time: 17:53   
Sample (adjusted): 1 532   
Included observations: 531 after adjustments  
Convergence achieved after 15 iterations  
QML (Huber/White) standard errors & covariance 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -1.548726 0.203939 -7.594076 0.0000 
TEXTILE 0.741621 0.316548 2.342842 0.0191 
NETWORTH -1.45E-08 7.15E-09 -2.034969 0.0419 
TOTALASSETS 3.39E-09 1.73E-09 1.966992 0.0492 
TO -2.63E-09 1.44E-09 -1.832475 0.0669 
PROFITMARG -0.046690 0.026269 -1.777378 0.0755 
     
     Mean dependent var 0.148776     S.D. dependent var 0.356203 
S.E. of regression 0.303171     Akaike info criterion 0.645359 
Sum squared resid 48.25398     Schwarz criterion 0.693661 
Log likelihood -165.3428     Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.664264 
Restr. log likelihood -223.3279     Avg. log likelihood -0.311380 
LR statistic (5 df) 115.9702     McFadden R-squared 0.259641 
Probability(LR stat) 0.000000    
     
     Obs with Dep=0 452      Total obs 531 
Obs with Dep=1 79    
     
     
The overall significance of the model is evaluated by the following goodness of fit 
tests. First the deviance of the model is calculated by the formula given by 3.9. 
“Likelihood of the current model” indicated in the formula is the same as “log 
likelihood” given in Table 4.8, and therefore has a value of -165.3428. Likelihood of 
the saturated model is the “restricted log likelihood” mentioned in the same Table 
and its value is -223.3279. Hence, deviance is calculated as 0.60124.   
As the conventional measure of goodness of fit, R2, is not particularly meaningful in 
binary regression models, pseudo-R2 and McFadden R2 are used. By the equation 
3.12, Pseudo-R2 of the model is calculated as 0.1792. As shown in the Table 4.8  
the value of McFadden R2 in our model is 0.2596.  
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To test the null hypothesis that all the slope coefficients are simultaneously equal to 
zero, the equivalent of the F test in the linear regression model is the likelihood ratio 
(LR) statistic. Given the null hypothesis, the LR statistic follows the X2 distribution 
with degrees of freedom equal to the number of explanatory variables (5 in our 
model). As indicated in the Table 4.8, LR statistic is 115.9702, whose p-value is 
0.000. Therefore, LR statistic indicates that the model is well-fitted.  
Table 4.9 Pearson Chi-Square Goodness of Fit for Logit Regression 
 
Dependent Variable: ACCEPTREJ      
Method: ML - Binary Logit (Quadratic hill climbing)    
Date: 12/10/07   Time: 17:53      
Sample (adjusted): 1 532      
Included observations: 531 after adjustments     
Andrews and Hosmer-Lemeshow Goodness-of-Fit Tests    
Grouping based upon predicted risk (randomize ties)    
         
         
   Quantile of Risk Dep=0 Dep=1 Total H-L 
 Low High Actual Expect Actual Expect Obs Value 
         
         1 0.0000 0.0004 53 52.9959 0 0.00413 53 0.00413 
2 0.0004 0.0115 53 52.7673 0 0.23275 53 0.23378 
3 0.0115 0.0441 51 51.5429 2 1.45711 53 0.20799 
4 0.0448 0.0824 52 49.6056 1 3.39437 53 1.80455 
5 0.0846 0.1194 51 47.5431 2 5.45690 53 2.44127 
6 0.1201 0.1465 47 45.9970 6 7.00304 53 0.16554 
7 0.1469 0.1627 46 44.7943 7 8.20568 53 0.20961 
8 0.1638 0.1898 44 43.9222 9 9.07779 53 0.00080 
9 0.1906 0.2985 39 39.8068 14 13.1932 53 0.06569 
10 0.2988 1.0000 16 23.0250 38 30.9750 54 3.73656 
         
         
  Total 452 452.000 79 79.0000 531 8.86992 
         
         H-L Statistic: 8.8699   Prob. Chi-Sq(8) 0.3534 
Andrews Statistic: 62.6359   Prob. Chi-Sq(10) 0.0000 
         
         
Other goodness-of-fit tests are Pearson X2 type tests, done through Eviews. Table 
4.9 demonstrates the results. Two tests were carried out: Hosmer-Lemeshow (1989) 
and Andrews (1988a, 1988b). The idea is to compare fitted expected values to the 
actual values by group. The X2 statistics are reported at the bottom of the table. The 
p-value for the HL test is large while the value for the Andrews test statistic is small. 
Therefore, HL test suggests the fit to be not successful, whereas Andrews test 
indicates a good fit.  
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In order to decide the effect of the logit regression parameters to the probability of 
credit rejection decision, the usual method is to calculate the marginal effect at the 
mean value of the explanatory variables. The mean values of the significant 
variables TO, NETWORTH, PROFITMARG, TOTALASSETS and TEXTILE are 
demonstrated in the Table 4.13 and hence the value of Z at the mean was -3.789. 
From this f(Z), value of logistic function at Z, can be obtained as 0.022. Here “b” 
stands for the coefficients in the regression equation. The table shows the marginal 
effects, calculated by multiplying f(Z) by the estimates of the coefficients of the logit 
regression.  
Table 4.10 Logit Estimation Marginal Effect 
 
Variable Mean b Mean x b f(Z) bf(Z) 
TO 386,905,695 -2.63E-09 -1.02E+00 0.022 -5.79E-11 
NETWORTH 155,894,390 -1.45E-08 -2.26E+00 0.022 -3.19E-10 
PROFITMARG 1.05 -0.047 -4.94E-02 0.022 -0.001 
TOTALASSETS 283,669,938 3.39E-09 9.62E-01 0.022 7.46E-11 
TEXTILE 0.17 0.742 1.26E-01 0.022 0.016 
Constant 1 -1.549 -1.55E+00   
Total     -3.789     
According to the calculated values in Table 4.10, one-point increase in the TO 
increases the probability of being rejected by -5.79E-9 percent, which is a very small 
number. Similarly the effect of NETWORTH and TOTALASSETS to the probability 
of rejection is very small. Therefore, the variables TO, NETWORTH, 
TOTALASSETS are insignificant at the 0.1 percent level. However, a one-point 
increase in the PROFITMARG decreases the credit rejection probability by 0.1%. 
Similarly, a one-point increase in TEXTILE increases the rejection probability by 
1.6%. Thus, PROFITMARG and TEXTILE are significant at the 0.1 percent level.  
4.5 Probit Regression Results 
Generally both probit and logit models come to the same conclusion, but the 
interpretation and magnitudes of coefficients are different. Through the forward 
selection algorithm -as explained in the section 4.2-, the variables in Table 4.12 are 
chosen. These are the same variables as the ones selected in the logistic 
regression. The probit regression results are shown in Table 4.11 and Table 4.12.  
 
 
  
 - 65 -   
 
TABLE 4.11 Univariate Probit Regression Results 
Variable Constant Coefficient p-value 
AGE -1.100 0.003 0.565 
EMPLOYEE -0.947 -4.01E-04 0.040 
TO -0.832 -1.53E-09 0.020 
NETWORTH -0.754 -6.82E-09 0.002 
CURRENTR -1.037 -4.40E-04 0.645 
SOLVENCYR -1.023 -1.34E-04 0.178 
PROFITMARG -1.101 -0.019 0.027 
SHRETURN -1.033 -0.007 0.031 
TOTALASSETS -0.927 -8.64E-10 0.015 
AUTOMTV -1.028 -0.376 0.310 
CHEM -1.021 -0.055 0.684 
CONSTR -1.023 -0.360 0.242 
ELECTRCL -1.042 -0.010 0.967 
MACHNRY -1.039 -0.243 0.656 
METAL -0.987 -0.815 0.011 
SERVICE -1.041 -0.016 0.937 
TEXTILE -1.177 0.629 0.000 
 
TABLE 4.12 Probit Regression Model Parameters 
Variable Coefficient 
Std. 
Errors 
P-
values 
constant -0.927 0.103 0.000 
TO -1.62E-09 7.78E-10 0.037 
NETWORTH -7.78E-09 2.91E-09 0.008 
PROFITMARG -0.017 0.008 0.033 
TOTALASSETS 2.08E-09 7.59E-10 0.006 
TEXTILE 0.473 0.172 0.006 
The calculated Probit model coefficients indicate the effect of the independent 
variables on the dependent variable. They show the change in the cumulative 
normal probability of the dependent variable when the independent variable 
changes by one unit. While logit model expressed log odds, the probit model gives 
z-scores.  
The Z-score equation of the underlying study is found as follows:  
( )( )1 1 0.927 1.62 09* 7.78 09*
0.017* 2.08 09* 0.473*
P Y E TO E NETWORTH
PROFITMARG E TOTALASSETS TEXTILE
−
= = − − − − −
− + − +
Ф
 
The output of the model from Eviews are shown in the Table 4.11.  
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TABLE 4.13 Probit regression statistics 
 
Dependent Variable: ACCEPTREJ  
Method: ML - Binary Probit (Quadratic hill climbing) 
Date: 12/10/07   Time: 17:32   
Sample (adjusted): 1 532   
Included observations: 531 after adjustments  
Convergence achieved after 15 iterations  
QML (Huber/White) standard errors & covariance 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -0.926942 0.103206 -8.981495 0.0000 
TEXTILE 0.473002 0.172209 2.746670 0.0060 
NETWORTH -7.78E-09 2.91E-09 -2.673142 0.0075 
TOTALASSETS 2.08E-09 7.59E-10 2.748004 0.0060 
TO -1.62E-09 7.78E-10 -2.087309 0.0369 
PROFITMARG -0.016798 0.007864 -2.136100 0.0327 
     
     Mean dependent var 0.148776     S.D. dependent var 0.356203 
S.E. of regression 0.312049     Akaike info criterion 0.657112 
Sum squared resid 51.12163     Schwarz criterion 0.705414 
Log likelihood -168.4631     Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.676016 
Restr. log likelihood -223.3279     Avg. log likelihood -0.317256 
LR statistic (5 df) 109.7295     McFadden R-squared 0.245669 
Probability(LR stat) 0.000000    
     
     Obs with Dep=0 452      Total obs 531 
Obs with Dep=1 79    
     
     
Similar to the logit model, the overall significance of the probit model is evaluated by 
the following goodness of fit tests. First the deviance of the model is calculated by 
the formula given by 3.9. Likelihood of the current model is given in Table 4.11 as    
-168.4631. Likelihood of the saturated model is in the same Table indicated as           
-223.3279, which are similar to those found for the logit model. Hence, deviance is 
calculated as 0.56384, which is lower than the logit regression model deviance. 
Therefore, according to this criteria probit model performed better.    
As other goodness of fit measures, by the equation 3.12, Pseudo-R2 of the model is 
calculated as 0.1710. As shown in the Table 4.11, the value of McFadden R2 in our 
model is 0.245669, which is close to the value calculated for the logit model.  
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To test the null hypothesis that all the slope coefficients are simultaneously equal to 
zero, the equivalent of the F test in the linear regression model, is the likelihood ratio 
(LR) statistic. Given the null hypothesis, the LR statistic follows the X2 distribution 
with degrees of freedom equal to the number of explanatory variables (5 in our 
model). As indicated in the Table 4.11, LR statistic is 109.7295, whose p-value is 
0.000. Therefore, LR statistic indicates that the model well-fitted.  
Table 4.14 Pearson Chi-Square Goodness of Fit for Probit Regression 
 
Dependent Variable: ACCEPTREJ      
Method: ML - Binary Probit (Quadratic hill climbing)    
Date: 12/10/07   Time: 17:32      
Sample (adjusted): 1 532      
Included observations: 531 after adjustments     
Andrews and Hosmer-Lemeshow Goodness-of-Fit Tests    
Grouping based upon predicted risk (randomize ties)    
         
         
   Quantile of Risk Dep=0 Dep=1 Total H-L 
 Low High Actual Expect Actual Expect Obs Value 
         
         1 0.0000 3.E-05 53 52.9999 0 0.00010 53 0.00010 
2 4.E-05 0.0089 53 52.8343 0 0.16570 53 0.16622 
3 0.0091 0.0462 51 51.6263 2 1.37372 53 0.29312 
4 0.0470 0.0926 52 49.3957 1 3.60426 53 2.01901 
5 0.0942 0.1272 50 47.0658 3 5.93421 53 1.63377 
6 0.1275 0.1515 47 45.5419 6 7.45807 53 0.33174 
7 0.1523 0.1673 46 44.4880 7 8.51199 53 0.31996 
8 0.1677 0.1908 45 43.6834 8 9.31663 53 0.22575 
9 0.1931 0.3075 34 39.4624 19 13.5376 53 2.96014 
10 0.3089 1.0000 21 27.4091 33 26.5909 54 3.04337 
         
         
  Total 452 454.507 79 76.4932 531 10.9932 
         
         H-L Statistic: 10.9932   Prob. Chi-Sq(8) 0.2021 
Andrews Statistic: 50.7470   Prob. Chi-Sq(10) 0.0000 
         
         
Table 4.12 demonstrates the Pearson X2 type tests of goodness-of-fit, done through 
Eviews. As in the results of the same tests for logit regression, the p-value for the 
Hosmer-Lemeshow (HL) test is large while the value for the Andrews test statistic is 
small. Therefore, HL test suggests that fit is not successful, while Andrew statistic 
indicates a good fit.  
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In order to decide the effect of the probit regression parameters to the probability of 
credit rejection decision, as in the case logit regression, the usual method is to 
calculate the marginal effect at the mean value of the explanatory variables. The 
mean values of the significant variables TO, NETWORTH, PROFITMARG, 
TOTALASSETS and TEXTILE are shown in the Table 4.13 and hence the value of 
the function Φ at the mean was -2.114. From this f(Z), value of probit function at Z, 
can be obtained as 0.0172. The table indicates the marginal effects, calculated by 
multiplying f(Z) by the estimates of the coefficients of the probit regression.  
Table 4.15 Probit Estimation Marginal Effect 
 
Variable Mean b Mean x b f(Z) bf(Z) 
TO 386,905,695 -1.62E-09 -6.27E-01 0.0172 -2.79E-11 
NETWORTH 155,894,390 -7.78E-09 -1.21E+00 0.0172 -1.34E-10 
PROFITMARG 1.05 -0.017 -1.79E-02 0.0172 0.000 
TOTALASSETS 283,669,938 2.08E-09 5.90E-01 0.0172 3.58E-11 
TEXTILE 0.17 0.473 8.04E-02 0.0172 0.008 
Constant 1 -0.927 -9.27E-01   
Total     -2.114     
According to the calculated marginal effects in the Table 4.13, one-point increase in 
the TO increases the probability of being rejected by -2.79E-11 percent, which is a 
very small number. Similarly, this probability is very small for the variables 
NETWORTH and TOTALASSETS, too. PROFITMARG has no effect to the credit 
rejection probability. Therefore, the variables TO, NETWORTH, TOTALASSETS, 
PROFITMARG are insignificant at the 0.1 percent level. However, a one-point 
increase in TEXTILE increases the rejection probability by 0.8%. Thus, TEXTILE is 
the only significant variable at the 0.1 percent level.  
4.5 Conclusions from Probit and Logit Regression Results 
The followings are concluded from the above results concerning both probit and logit 
models: Even though generally logit and probit analysis yield similar marginal 
effects, in our study some results they provided were different. From the marginal 
effects calculated for the probit model, only the binary variable “textile” found to be 
significant. In the case of logit model, “textile” and profit margin were significant 
variables. The marginal effect of the variable “textile” to the credit refusal decision 
probability  was larger in logit regression result than that in probit regression. Since, 
the tails of the logit and probit distributions are different, they can give different 
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results if the sample is unbalanced, with most of the outcomes similar.40 This is the 
case in our study, because only 14.85% of the credit applications were rejected.   
 In addition; all size variables used in the study -namely turnover, net worth and total 
assets of a company- played no significant role in credit granting decision of the 
financial institution.  
Furthermore, the sector (except textile) in which the firm operated had no significant 
impact in the credit decision of the financial institution. Concerning textile sector 
companies, financial institutions indeed became more prudent in their credit granting 
process after the abolition of import quotas in the textile industry starting from the 
beginning of 2005. This liberalisation effected the textile companies operating in 
Turkey negatively and they faced problems to compete especially with Chinese and 
Indian companies. The models therefore provided a meaningful result about the 
selectivity of the financial institution to grant credit to textile industry companies.  
4.6 Comparison of Probit and Logit Regression Results with 
the Model Parameters of the Moody’s Private Company 
Rating Model 
In this section we will compare our results with the rating model of Moody’s for 
private companies, RiskCalc. Moody’s indicates that higher profitability should raise 
a firm’s equity value. It also implies a longer way for revenues to fall or costs to rise 
before losses occur. The set of profitability measures used by Moody’s are 
EBIT/assets, net income/common equity, net income/assets and operating profit 
margin. In our study net profit margin is used and it was significant in the logit 
regression model but not significant in probit regression.  
Moody’s mentions that, in addition to profitability, leverage is a key measure of firm 
risk. The higher the leverage, or gearing, the smaller the cushion for adverse 
shocks. Total liabilities/tangible assets, total debt/total assets, total liabilities/total 
assets, total debt/net worth, debt service coverage ratio are utilised by Moody’s in its 
rating system. In our empirical research, we used total debt/total assets as a model 
parameter, however it is found to be insignificant in both probit and logit models.  
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Other parameters used by Moody’s are size variables. Moody’s states that size is 
related to volatility. Smaller size implies less diversification and less depth in 
management, which implies greater susceptibility to idiosyncratic shocks. Sales 
turnover and total assets are utilised by Moody’s. In our study, in addition to those, 
net worth is also included. However, size measures were insignificant in our models.  
 As stated by Moody’s, liquidity is a common variable in most credit decisions. That 
is, if the company has sufficient current assets, it can pay current liabilities. Current 
ratio, quick ratio, working capital/total assets, cash/total assets, short term debt/total 
debt are used by Moody’s. In our study, current ratio is used and found to be 
insignificant.  
Activity ratios, e.g. accounts receivables/cost of goods sold, sales/total assets, 
accounts payable/cost of goods sold, accounts receivables/sales, inventory/cost of 
goods sold are included in the model of Moody’s. However, Moody’s indicates that 
activity ratios have less straightforward relations to risk than other variables. Sales 
growth and audit quality are other parameters utilised by Moody’s. Due to 
inexistence of appropriate data, these measures are not included in our study.  
Several factors, such as industry specific information and management quality, that 
affect credit are not addressed in the model of Moody’s. The major reason for this 
exclusion indicated by Moody’s is that they are too difficult to measure consistently. 
In our model, we included industry dummies. We found out that only “textile” 
variable was significant but other industry dummies were insignificant.  
Even though not all the parameters to compare with the model of Moody’s could be 
obtained, above results indicate that qualitative information and/or judgement played 
an important role in the credit assessment and approval process of the analysed 
financial institution. This is because the main criteria applied by the model of 
Moody’s, such as leverage or debt ratios and liquidity were insignificant. Another 
main criteria, profitability was only significant in the logit regression.  
Finally, Moody’s mentions that many ratios are correlates with credit quality. Given 
these variables’ correlations with each other, one has to choose a select subset in 
order to generate a stable statistical model. The above mentioned ratios used by 
Moody’s were suggested by their univariate power and tested within a multivariate 
framework on private firm data. Therefore, with the Basel II implementation, it is 
forecasted that  those parameters will be utilised by financial institutions as a criteria 
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in their rating and credit decision models. This is due to the fact that rating 
companies’ rating grades will be the basis for Basel II-Standard Approach. With the 
implementation of Basel II-IRB Approach, similar models as those of rating 
companies are being used or will be constructed internally by the financial 
institutions. Basel II framework states that each borrower and facility must be 
assigned a rating prior to the bank entering into a commitment to lend, i.e. during the 
credit approval process. Best practices of the banks, which is the base of Basel II  
framework, also indicates that credit rating systems typically include both 
quantitative (e.g. financial ratios) and qualitative but standardised (e.g. industry, 
payment history/credit report) factors. The modelling technique are mainly 
discriminant, logit-based, or based on classic credit scoring techniques. 41 
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CHAPTER 5  
CONCLUSION  
This study analyses the credit assessment processes of a specific financial 
institution in Turkey and compares the main drivers of corporate credit approval 
decisions with the parameters of Moody’s rating model for private companies, 
RiskCalc.  
The main findings of the thesis are summarised as follows: 
Firstly, the conclusions from the Basel II framework and its application in Turkey in 
terms of credit assessment processes are the followings: The Basel I and Basel II 
Accords (Chapter 2) both have as an objective to further strengthen the soundness 
and stability of the international banking system. Although Basel II is generally 
considered an important step forward, its effectiveness is globally debated. 
Currently, because of the recent turbulence in the financial markets related to the 
sub-prime mortgage crisis, Basel II is scrutinised. While preparing for the 
implementation of Basel II, the Turkish banking sector has also been reviewing and 
adjusting its risk assessment processes. The latest BRSA report prepared (end-
2006) suggests that Turkish Banks are still in the initial phases of implementation, 
but on the other hand consider it as a highly important subject. Significant progress 
has already been made in terms of system and infrastructure. Regarding the Basel 
Accords, it should be acknowledged that credit rating is a very recent issue in 
Turkey. Still, only some internationally active, stock exchange listed companies 
and/or financial institutions have external credit ratings from the major rating 
companies S&P, Moody’s or Fitch. On the other hand, almost all Turkish banks 
utilise credit risk analysis results in decision making processes. Most banks also use 
it in specifying medium and long terms strategies, but only to a lesser extent in limit 
allocations, investment and placement decisions as well as performance 
evaluations. In general it is expected that the majority of the banks will apply the 
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Standard Approach (SA). The Basel Accord defines the SA as a system in which 
ratings of external rating institutions are recognised by the national supervisory 
authorities in determining the risk weights in capital allocation. Consequently, 
improvement of risk management practices is expected parallel to the 
implementation of Basel II. It is forecasted that financial institutions will be able to 
apply information provided through ratings and credit analysis in a broader sense. 
Traditionally, -as mentioned above- insufficiency of structural and reliable historical 
default-data series constrained  default-modelling practices in Turkey. Recently 
banks have started to adjust or improve their IT systems and a pooled data base for 
corporate loans managed by the National Credit Bureau, as suggested by the Basel 
Committee,  is foreseen.  
Secondly, the conclusions from the modelling of credit decision data of the financial 
institution -whether to accept a loan application are as follows:  Logit and probit 
regression models (Chapter 3) are among the most practiced methods and 
mentioned in the Basel II framework as the best practices in internal credit approval 
and credit scoring processes. With the use of such modelling techniques and the 
help of corporate loan decision data obtained from a major financial institution in 
Turkey empirical research was executed (Chapter 4). The regression coefficients 
are estimated using the method of maximum likelihood. Initially, 17 variables are 
analysed each in a univariate model. Those variables were firm-specific factors (e.g. 
age and number of employees), financial variables including ratios and size figures 
as well as a binary variable  (the industry in which the company operates). The 
variables in both multivariate logit and probit models are selected through a forward 
selection algorithm, i.e. a process which includes the variables one by one to the 
model in accordance to their predictive power.   
• Even though generally logit and probit analysis yield similar marginal effects, 
in our study some of the results they provided were different. Marginal 
effects calculated for the logit model indicated that the profit margin and the 
binary variable “textile” –indicating whether the company is operating in the 
textile industry or not- are significant. From the marginal effects calculated 
for the probit model, only the binary variable “textile” found to be significant. 
The marginal effect of the variable to the credit refusal decision probability  
was larger in logit regression result than that in probit regression. Since, the 
tails of the logit and probit distributions are different, they can give different 
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results if the sample is unbalanced, with most of the outcomes similar.42 This 
is the case in our study, because only 14.85% of the credit applications were 
rejected. All size variables used in the study -namely turnover, net worth and 
total assets of a company- played no significant role in credit granting 
decision of the financial institution.  
• The sector (except textile) in which the firm operated played no role in the 
credit decision of the financial institution. Concerning textile sector 
companies, financial institutions indeed became more prudent in their credit 
granting process after the abolition of import quotas in the textile industry 
starting from the beginning of 2005. This liberalisation effected the textile 
companies operating in Turkey negatively and they faced problems to 
compete especially with Chinese and Indian companies. The models 
therefore provided a meaningful result about the selectivity of the financial 
institution to grant credit to textile industry companies.  
Thirdly, the comparison of our results with the rating model of Moody’s for private 
companies yielded the following results:  
• Even though profitability parameter is used by Moody’s, it was significant in 
the logit regression model but not significant in probit regression in the 
underlying study. In addition; debt or leverage ratios, size variables, e.g. total 
assets, net worth turnover and liquidity ratios are part of Moody’s rating 
system. Contrary to that, in the empirical research they are found to be 
insignificant in both models. Activity ratios are also incorporated by Moody’s 
in its rating model, although Moody’s indicates that these have less 
straightforward relations to risk than other variables. Sales growth and audit 
quality are other parameters utilised by Moody’s. Due to inexistence of 
appropriate data, these measures are not included in the empirical research.  
• Several factors, such as industry specific information and management 
quality, that affect credit are not addressed in the model of Moody’s. The 
major reason for this exclusion indicated by Moody’s is that they are too 
difficult to measure consistently. In our model, we included industry 
dummies. We found out that only “textile” variable was significant but other 
industry dummies were insignificant.  
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The above mentioned ratios used by Moody’s were suggested by their univariate 
power and tested within a multivariate framework on private firm data. Moody’s 
mentions that many ratios are correlated with credit quality. Given these variables’ 
correlations with each other, one has to choose a select subset in order to generate 
a stable statistical model. Therefore, with the Basel II implementation, it is 
forecasted that  those parameters will be used by financial institutions as a criteria in 
their rating and credit decision models. This is due to the fact that rating companies’ 
ratings will be the basis for  Basel II-Standard Approach. With the implementation of 
Basel II-IRB (internal ratings based) Approach, similar models as those of rating 
companies have already been used or will be constructed internally by the financial 
institutions. The Basel II framework states that each borrower and facility must be 
assigned a rating prior to the bank entering into a commitment to lend, i.e. during the 
credit approval process. Best practices of the banks, which are the base of Basel II  
framework, also indicate that credit rating systems typically include both quantitative 
(e.g. financial ratios) and qualitative but standardised (e.g. industry, payment 
history/credit report) factors. The modelling techniques are mainly discriminant, logit-
based, or based on classic credit scoring techniques. 43 
Furthermore, from the qualitative information provided by the institution through an 
interview, the rating system and the use of information through the rating are 
analysed. Firstly it was observed that the institution used an expert judgement 
based process and rated mainly the current condition of the companies, i.e. point-in-
time rating. To be able to prove this statistically, one should observe time series 
default data of the institution. Due to inability to obtain this information, such an 
analysis could not be made. This quantitative information suggests a contrary 
application compared to the Basel II framework, which prescribes the use of 
statistical default models and through-the-cycle rating system. The latter is a rating 
philosophy estimating the borrower’s condition at the worst point in an economic or 
industrial cycle. Such a rating system is especially important to assess the 
companies operating in developing countries with a highly cyclical economy, such 
as Turkey. In a through-the-cycle rating process the variables should include 
macroeconomic variables, e.g. GDP growth rates, exchange rates and interest 
rates. Secondly, the analysed institution used the rating information only for 
management reporting and limit setting, but not for pricing, compensation and/or risk 
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adjusted performance measurement purposes. As underlined above, this practice 
should also change over time. In fact, the practices of the financial institution confirm 
the earlier statements on credit risk management in Turkey, namely that it is still in 
the early phases.  
In conclusion, the models in this study can be used by the financial institution to 
make a decision whether to grant credit or not. In future studies, as underlined 
above, in case of availability of a data set including time series of default data, 
default dynamics can be analysed. With such data the impact of macroeconomic 
conditions such as the output gap, the yield curve, level of GDP and inflation 
defaults can be analysed.  
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CHAPTER 6 
APPENDIX 
Figure 6.1 Histogram of the Variable “AGE”  
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Figure 6.2 Histogram of the Variable “CURRENTR” 
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Figure 6.3 Histogram of the Variable “EMPLOYEE” 
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Figure 6.4 Histogram of the Variable “NETWORTH” 
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Figure 6.5 Histogram of the Variable “PROFITMARG” 
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Figure 6.6 Histogram of the Variable “SHRETURN” 
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Figure 6.7 Histogram of the Variable “SOLVENCYR” 
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Figure 6.8 Histogram of the Variable “TO” 
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Figure 6.9 Histogram of the Variable “TOTALASSETS” 
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Figure 6.10 Histogram of the Variable “AUTOMTV” 
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Figure 6.11 Histogram of the Variable “CHEM” 
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Figure 6.12 Histogram of the Variable “ELECTRCL” 
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Figure 6.13 Histogram of the Variable “MACHNRY” 
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Figure 6.14 Histogram of the Variable “METAL” 
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Figure 6.15 Histogram of the Variable “SERVICE” 
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Figure 6.16 Histogram of the Variable “TEXTILE” 
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Figure 6.17 Histogram of the Variable “CONST” 
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